Learning from Solid Waste Management
in Palestine

Evaluation of the project
*Improvement of environment
and hygiene conditions
of the community of
Shu'fat refugee camp*

Silva Ferretti
With the collaboration of Marinella Pellé
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Contents

Methodology

This evaluation was:

- **User and use focused**. It strives to ensure that findings can really inform project work and be useful to diverse stakeholders.
- **Participatory / facilitative.** There has been a long debate in the evaluation field about "internal vs. external evaluation". Too little attention has been given to the middle ground: facilitated evaluation, where an external consultant can act as a sounding board, offer ideas for reflection, bring in new questions and viewpoints. CESVI staff – and other stakeholders – were given spaces where to rethink and deepen their work. And they could also share views and ideas that – under day-to-day pressure – are often not debated. All this lead to critical reflection and learning.
- **Appreciative, not extractive.** The diverse evaluation stakeholders were engaged in conversation, not only aimed at "extracting information for the report". Such conversations were an opportunity to think forward together, being aware of past challenges and future risk.
- **Strategic and forward-looking.** This evaluation was not about "looking at what is happening", but an opportunity to rethink strategically: building on the past to improve the way forward. It was about learning – immediately applicable one, and not just on "compliance". It recognizes that, in some cases, compliance might even be problematic: this happen when compliance about activities get primacy over the commitment to achieve relevant intervention in context. Taking that higher stance (which is easier to do during a process of critical reflection rather than in day to day work!) helped to rethink some programme assumptions.

The evaluation activities are documented in the evaluation diary,
It is online at
https://iswmshufatcamp.wordpress.com/category/evaluation-diary/

In the course of the evaluation we held:
- Meetings with project staff
- Meetings with partner organization
- Meetings with field staff
- Meeting with key stakeholders outside the Camp (UNRWA / Consultant)
- Meetings with stakeholders in Shu'fat Camp. We decided to limit the interviews to stakeholders to a minimum. The evaluator had already an opportunity to meet some stakeholders in the camp, aside a previous evaluation. Not a lot had changed since, as actions were delayed. The previous visit had already captured the frustration of the CSO leaders for an endless process of consultation, so we did not want to further exacerbate that.

Also, most of the challenges were already known by the staff: rather than simply engaging in a process of interviews and field visits to confirm them, the evaluation become a space to look into them and consider a way forward. We therefore prioritized conversations with these actors more likely to provide actionable ideas and options.

A user and used focused *methodology*

This evaluation believes that "use and user focused" should not only be referred to the evaluation findings. The methodology itself – can be use/user focused! An evaluation can have a strong impact in showing new ways to look at change, which are often relegated in obscure methodology chapter… whilst they might have a lot to offer to an organization!

A methodology does not necessarily need to be academic and abstract. And use/user focused methodology will be designed to be relevant for the programme: as a way to share skills, tools, ideas that a team can then use and adapt in their own work. This of course is better achieved within a facilitated / participatory evaluation, where evaluation stakeholders can join, hands on, in testing approaches.

Testing approaches and tools useful to the project

Approaches used in the evaluation – with potential to be adapted - included:

Facilitated conversations.
Early on in the evaluation, coordination and interaction amongst different actors within the project (e.g. organizations, technical experts, local CBOs) emerged as poor. The evaluation was an opportunity to initiate facilitated appreciative conversations: on achievements so far and on further possibilities. It is hoped they will continue in the future, strengthening coordination and sharing.

Conversation oriented at "problem solving".
The evaluation engaged people not only to check compliance, but to stimulate problem solving, ideas sharing. The approach has been critical, but appreciative. This interaction style fits well with the nature of the programme. Staff seems to already be at ease with this way of working, which, if continued, will be a powerful way to sustain active participation. This approach might also guide the setup of adequate feedback systems: which do not stop at "complaints" but also stimulate propositions.

Generation of tools for strategic reflection (the TOC cards).
A theory of change was derived as a backbone for this evaluation. Transforming it into a deck of card helped to test and show, immediately, its relevance. And, as explained in a subsequent chapter, the TOC deck cards can be used in a variety of ways.

Storyboarding.
A storyboard involves translating a process of change into images. Storyboarding helps understanding how the planned change will unfold, in practice. It is a very strong tool to make desired change more tangible. Too often discussions on activities and plans stop at an abstract level: it is not then possible to really anticipate challenges and options. The storyboarding process allowed us to define critical junctures of the project, to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats for the project in a deeper way than conventional / abstract analysis. Storytelling imposes a discipline of "one slide, one idea… but clear". It was therefore also a good basis to identify what messages should be shared with people.

Blogging (and tools for transparency / sharing).
One challenge of this project was the sharing of information. For example, despite the investment in participation of local CBOs, they lacked information and feedback on decision. The same applies to the environmental educators. Capacity to transparently share information is a very important asset for generating accountability. Using a blog – but also timelines, shared documents – during the evaluation phase, helped to practice and test such tools. We also discussed how they can be further linked to social media for further dissemination.

Network analysis.
Network analysis – i.e. the capacity to show connection and look into them – is key for appreciating complexity. It can be applied to activities, to stakeholders. The "network" is too often a soft aspect, not featured in the current ways to capture changed (results based). Yet network building is often a substantial and crucial part of any humanitarian / development project. Hence the importance of introducing tools that can "show" such networks and connections, and demonstrate that they are real assets, worth looking into.

Data visualization.
This project had invested a lot in data analysis (e.g. with the KAP), but it became apparent that the investment had not paid back: the insights gained were not up to investment. The use of data visualization tools helped to discuss the true potential of information use during the project: did you take full advantage of the investment in data collection? What questions were worth asking? What data disaggregation could have been significant? How better could the information be gathered?

Georeferenced data.
The programme is already making a very impressive use of GIS, which is one if its strengths. The evaluation built on this by offering additional tools for monitoring change through street view mapping.

Using new technologies

We used many diverse software and apps for all the above. We focused on free software, easily to use and running on multiple platforms. Some were suggested by the consultant, other by the local team. More information about how they were used in the evaluation is contained in the evaluation blog.

	What resources?	For what
	Blogs WordPress wordpress.com/	A blog is a very versatile container. Its pages and posts can contain text but also multimedia / pointers to online resources – including all the options below. Posts and pages can be aggregated by categories – allowing for a very effective filing and retrieval of information. And a blog can of course support transparency and stronger communication, by creating a portal for the project, open to interested stakeholders. Materials on the blog can then be further shared through social media.

Google Drive	**Document sharing** Google Drive *drive.google.com*	Generation of documents which can be viewed/and or edited online. Strengthen collaboration in co-editing text and information. We used it for example to revise the TOC cards and to work on storyboarding.
Mapillary	**Street view maps** Mapillary *www.mapillary.com/*	We discussed at length the potential of Mapillary to complement the existing geographical information base. One application could be the pre-post monitoring of the solid waste situation.
	Network mapping Kumu *kumu.io/*	We did not use it extensively in the evaluation, but we discussed its potential for analysis of relationship amongst project stakeholders.
Timeline JS Easy-to-make, beautiful timelines.	**Timeline** Timeline JS timeline.knightlab.com/	Project staff started to create timelines, to better capture achievements along time.
lapse it	**Timelapse** Lapseit *www.lapseit.com/*	We used it to keep track of our facilitated discussion. We created small animations, testing potential messages on solid waste (and to get feedback on their suitability / alternatives). We anticipated it could be used to track the creation of the hotspots.
+ableau+public	**Data visualization** Tableau public *public.tableau.com*	We used it to extract more insights from the KAP. This lead to discuss the need of a policy of "less but more", for evidence generation: less data, more analysis

Thinking strategically: why a theory of change?

A theory of change is often perceived as an abstract demand or bureaucratic requirement. CESVI staff in Palestine, instead, had invested in:

- **Ensuring that a theory of change can emerge from its practice and grow in the long term**. As highlighted in the box below, the Theory of Change was firstly developed for a CESVI Tulkarem Project in 2017. This evaluation checked the relevance of the TOC, adapted it, and strengthened it further. It can then become a strategic tool for further programmes.
- **Co-designing a non-conventional evaluation process - to further sharpen such TOC and build ownership amongst staff**. The evaluation become an opportunity of critical reflection for the staff / other key stakeholders also on the TOC. This was possible because the evaluation was designed to be strategic, oriented to learning, participative. Rather than being "imposed", the Theory of Change was sharpened with their views and ideas. It is hoped that this will help to build ownership and use.

Building on previous work

What is a theory of change, why it matters, and what is the emerging theory of change of CESVI in Palestine (re: Integrated Solid Waste Management programmes) is captured in a previous report: *Towards A Theory of Change*, June 2017.

The report is accessible on the ISWM Shu'fat blog, at the address: https://iswmshufatcamp.files.wordpress.com/2018/02/final-report.pdf

Playing with the Theory of Change.

The way in which we captured and presented the TOC was certainly non-conventional: a deck of cards. A deck of cards is:

- **Simple**: it forced us to move from the usual reporting jargon to more effective ways to communicate key activities. It also linked content to easy to grasp visuals.
- **Playful:** using cards in the discussions helped to make them much more interactive and to seamlessly create a participatory environment.
- **Flexible**: cards can be shuffled, can be repositioned. They can be added or removed. Flexibility helps to convey that a theory of change needs to be adaptive.
- **Versatile.** A deco of cards can be used as a "checklist". It can be laid out to show connections/ relations/ structures. It could help to "put ideas" on the table, which can be picked up in any order.

The TOC cards accompanied us throughout the evaluation. They helped to:

- **Build a shared understanding:** using the cards allowed us to speak the same language. Ideas such as "participation, advocacy…" are often understood in many diverse ways. Through the cards we aligned our understanding, and this helped our conversations. In some cases, the cards required reformulation, as they were not always immediately clear. Changing the cards equates to seamlessly capture and share better understanding.
- **Think "strategic relevance".** We always questioned if all the cards were needed, or else, if needed more cards. This corresponded to checking the strategic coherence of the project – and programming priorities and focus.
- **Focus on processes, outcomes, soft aspects – and not only on activities and results.** The cards helped to capture the importance of process. They featured key actions which tended to be at the outcome level – not simply outputs. Many cards also capture these soft elements (e.g. mediation, participation, capacity building) which are the essence of many programmes, yet fail to be featured as they do not deliver easy to pinpoint hard results. Their apparent simplicity disguises quite a sophisticated way to look into projects.
- **Bring more people and perspectives around the table.** The cards were used for discussion amongst CESVI project staff. They were used in discussing with their Overseas partners. They were used across different projects – to confront challenges and options in Shu'fat and in Tulkarem.

Talking around a theory of change: a way to learn across programme

This evaluation shows how learning can grow across programme. The cards were built in previous learning activity. And they were also used and improved, to discuss other ongoing processes. So rather than just judging a project, we could look at trends, compare contexts, connect ideas. This is the advantage of a theory of change. It can help to ask important questions such as:

- Is CESVI encountering the same challenges over and over?
- To what extent different activities and achievements were influenced by the context? By the management? By the diverse engagement of key stakeholders?
- Which innovation are emerging?
- Which practices are worth consolidating and sharing further, as they consistently prove effective?

Using the same TOC helps different programme managers to sit at the same table and explore areas often not discussed. It helped people to look beyond the actions listed in the logframe, and focus on the key activities underpinning them -for example: what modalities of participation are in use? How are institution supported? What "soft" aspects and expertise (e.g. mediation, capacity building…) need to be employed?

It is hoped that the TOC cards will be a useful tool for CESVI. They should of course be seen as an evolving one, to grow with the understanding and learning of the organization. They could be used:

Before	During	After	Across
Before setting new programme: as a checklist of practices / processes worth featuring, as a way to capitalize previous learning.	To check adherence with the theory of change, to identify areas worth strengthening, (and new spaces for action!), to discuss coherence, priorities	To consolidate learning, to check achievements, to evaluate both the programme and the TOC	Across different programmes, across field and headquarters: to share practices, to exchange ideas.

Learning on TOC activities.

This first section consolidated insights and ideas re: the key activities featured in the TOC.

	CESVI seeks to achieve change in solid waste management – so that it leads to sound environmental change – by working in three interrelated domains of change, represented as a triangle: • Technical support • Support to institutions • Engagement with citizens Each one requires engaging on several key activities. Domains of change interact to generate change. Other activities help to connect the domains of change (e.g., from technical to institutions, from institutions to citizens, from citizens to technical – and vice versa) This is also illustrated in a video: https://youtu.be/h6L8yKuUJP0

A note on institutions:

Whilst other areas of change were self-evident, the area of institutions had to be clarified:

- **Clarity about what an institution is (i.e.: there are many institutions beyond the government!).** Institutions are normed, established structures. They govern behaviours of individuals within a community / society. They can be informal - such as customs, or behaviour patterns. They can be formal- such as the government and public services.
- **Institutions / citizens are fluid definitions**. We observed that local citizens organizations could be ambiguous: in some cases, it was useful to consider them within the social change area (e.g. when looking at how to strengthen participation, how to mobilize people and so on). But they are, of course, also institutions. It is important to work on the continuum.

technical **Provide technical assistance to service design** • Provide expertise for better design of waste management • Support design / implementation of solid waste programmes	This has been the core of the project. CESVI helped to put together a plan adapting technical options to the local context.
technical **Identify practices** • Identification of practices worth adapting (from research, from communities)	In the initial version of the TOC this activity was named "research". We now clarified that the name of the game is not really to *do* research, but rather to *identify practices worth sharing*: from academia, from other projects, but also from the community. Organizations, of course, also bring in their own expertise from previous projects. They highlighted examples of this: for example, the use of 4R by Overseas. ⊙ **Look for positive deviance within communities!** Local practices on waste management at the household level are not sufficiently known by the project. For example: are there positive practices worth sharing / looking into? (or, more in general: what practices are in use?) This was a missed opportunity, also in consideration of the major investment in participation and local level analysis by the programme

technical **Adapt, pilot, innovate** - Foster adaptation of existing good practices - Pilot innovative options for uptake	The programme is introducing equipment (such as the static compactor) and modalities of collection (primary collection through bins) which are new in Shu 'fat and will require testing and adaptation. However, there is now very little time left to work on adaptation and adjustment – due to delays in the planning phase. CESVI was keen to quickly scale up the system, with a fast roll out in all Shu'fat. ○ **Massive roll outs – especially of activities that require lots of micro adjustments – should be discouraged**. Even if time lacks, piloting and adaptation should be preferred. This will enable CESVI 1) to do needed corrections to the plan and also 2) use the piloting phase as a way to build capacities for roll out, on the job. It is key that pilot is also accompanied by ⇨ strong monitoring coupled with ⇨ agile management. It was emphasized that innovations have been introduced in the hotspot. The water collection points are for example a new feature. If this is the case, however, some of the design glitches (water logging, height of the taps of the collecting bins) should have better designed. ○ **If the project introduces "innovation", it should be designed with more care for details.** This was the case, for example, of the water collection points. Innovation should not relate only to technical / hardware aspects, but also to social ones. In this regards, communication and participation mechanisms offered a big potential. However, the participatory aspects had overall being resented by the people (and where adjusted too late in the programme). And communication / awareness raising – rather than growing throughout the programme, have been left to the end, where there will just be the space for rolling out a communication campaign rather than learning and testing what works in Shu'fat when engaging with different audiences. ○ **Ensure adaptation and piloting of "soft aspects.** "Soft" aspects (e.g. participation and communication) also need adaptation and piloting, and this was a major limitation of the programme. benefit from adaptation and piloting.
Technical **Build strategic partnerships for research / methodologies** - Strategic collaboration with researchers (ongoing, not one-off!) - Work through coherent, strong methodologies - Strengthen local research actors (e.g. academia – but also engineering practices)	Whilst cross-fertilization of practices and partnerships can be a strong asset - it seems that the program had over-relied on them and failed to integrate them in the programme. For example, participation was contracted out to a consultancy implementing its own methodology – but its work was never synergized with the overall programme, and the partnership eventually broke. Overseas adopted Reggio Children Approach methodologies, but they have not been satisfied of the training. They are in the process of seeking local actors to address communication gaps and get a better adaptation to the local context. The challenge, however, is that that is shift had taken a long time and has been little communicated locally: the people we met in Shu'fat felt very unclear about what was happening and where to go next. ○ **Ensure that methodologies are adapted to the local context** – and prioritize linkages with local ones. ○ **Ensure that approaches suit the implementing organizations.** Partnerships should complement/integrate, not substitute/challenge the approach of the implementing organizations. ○ **Whilst engaging partnerships for research / new methods,** make sure that partnerships remain ad-hoc activities: a sense of continuity and progress need to be built, and partnerships should not remain external contributions, but be better embedded in the programme. By capitalizing on the learning and experience of this project, CESVI can strengthen its of strategic approach, integrating learning from diverse approaches – and understanding their contributions and limitations. Documentation, learning, monitoring will be an asset for that. ○ **Ensure that the project experience can be capitalized and shared.** CESVI shall consolidate learning around the project – as an opportunity to consolidate the diverse methodological inputs that the project brought together.
technical	• The **programme is largely about establishing a good solid waste chain** and did so in coordination with UNRWA and the local people. **Economic / logistical issues had to be balanced out with concerns by local population** (e.g. fear that the infrastructure provided could be removed and used elsewhere). ○ **technical assessment / cost benefits analysis needs to be balanced**

Complement expertise: economic, environmental • Value chain analysis and intervention • Market analysis • Cost/benefit analysis • Environmental assessment / assessment of externalities	**out by social concerns**. CESVI recognized that in negotiations and had an important role in mediating different interests. The programme analysed **paper and cardboard value chain**. But the **initial estimates were not reliable**. The environmental educators had to be involved again in revising the estimates (an activity now ongoing). ○ Specific value chain studies are important to evaluate further options (e.g. recycling). The lesson learnt was the importance of **more rigorous analysis.** Assessment of externalities involves **considerations far beyond the reach of the project** (e.g. the impact that the new approach will have on the neighbouring areas, now relying on the support of UNRWA; the choice of disposal locations). Staff is well aware of it, but they also know up to where the programme can realistically reach. ○ **Link to advocacy (direct/indirect) to address externalities.** Staff is aware that challenges beyond the remit of the project will matter. Hence the need not to let them drop and **engage in direct or indirect advocacy**.
technical **Provide legal support** • Analysis / advice on legal / administrative requirements	This area did not initially feel relevant for project partners. It quickly emerged, however, that clarity about norms and procedures is essential, and very often lacking. For example, Overseas support of women groups will involve choosing amongst different administrative setups – which important consequences on the status / tax taxation of the groups. But alternatives are not yet clear. Similar concerns apply to norms regulating solid management (for example: re the management of transfer stations) – within the very complex bureaucratic context of Palestine / Israel. ○ **Recognize and cater for legal advice.** Some of the decision to be taken require solid legal advice. It is important that CESVI recognizes it early on and build measures in its programmes to better provide it.
technical **Data gathering and analysis** • Support to creation of data collection and analysis systems (emphasis on quality data)	This card emphasized the need for creating sound systems for data collection and analysis as key aspect for technical support. It emphasized the importance of rigorous analysis by CESVI, and the investment done on it. But is an obvious overlapping with a similar card at the institutional level. It is encouraged that eventually CESVI should move towards merging data collection efforts with institutional activities: to emphasize that data collection and monitoring should not just be done for their own sake and remain within the organization. Data collection should best be linked to decision making processes, and lead to systems, setups that can be handed over for sustainability.
Technical / institutions **Capacity building / Knowledge sharing** • Assessment of existing capacities • Provision of expertise through training, coaching, accompaniment	Interestingly, within the project the capacity building component was not emphasized. It has largely been a process of accompaniment. This component – coaching / accompaniment on the job – will become relevant as the implementation of the new system starts. Staff should be vigilant, and check – in the piloting and roll out phase – for any issue requiring capacity building and accompaniment.
Technical / institutions 	The capacity to advocate for sound technical options is a core skill of CESVI, and the organization proved – and it is recognized for – its know-how. As the project was ongoing, CESVI had also generated strong linkages with other actors, UNRWA in particular. Beyond the project, major assignments – such as the Solid Waste Management strategy – had been commissioned to

Make advocacy on technical options • Promotion of sound options for solid waste management, grounded solid know-how / research. • Strengthening organizational credibility and increasing access to policy and decision makers	CESVI. CESVI is now highly regarded, as a leading organization on solid waste management. UNRWA itself emphasized how interlinked strategic and project work were, and hard to disentangle.
Technical / institutions **Sustain & institutionalize technical support** • Ensure that investment in capacity building and expertise is sustained. For example: engage with academia.	This aspect links closely to the above. On one side, being recognized and called in for its capacity, is a strong asset for the organization – and CESVI should capitalize on it – ensuring that it can continue to retain capable expertise. On the other side, however, reliance of UNRWA on CESVI's technical expertise can have consequences for the sustainability of the solid waste management. At a time where resources are limited, a survival strategy for UNRWA is to outsource important strategic tasks to fill capacity gaps / reduce costs. O CESVI must navigate the thin line existing between being recognized for its expertise and actually becoming de-facto subcontracted by larger organizations such as UNRWA.
Technical / institutions **Support other organizations' advocacy efforts** Ensuring that research and expertise can be shared with organizations, and used for their advocacy efforts, for example through: • dissemination of practices, to encourage uptake; • participation to knowledge sharing events; • creation of synergies with active platforms / actors.	CESVI, as an organization, is not keen to engage directly on advocacy: it is not in its DNA. Staff and partners, however, are very aware of the potential of its analysis for advocating for improved practices, or to show existing challenges beyond the project. For example: the project will measure the amount of garbage that is brought to Shu'fat transfer station by the non-resident O **Proactively share insights for advocacy.** The knowledge accumulated by CESVI about the current solid waste management system - and about opportunities and challenges beyond the project - would be wasted if not used to influence positive changes in the system. If not keen to work on advocacy, CESVI must ensure that the knowledge can be effectively shared with other organizations, institutions, individuals keen to do so.
Institutions	The project invested substantially in data gathering and analysis, and this topic has been covered extensively in the main section of this report. The investment on data collection / evidence driven action is a strength of the programme, which could be improved by: O Reducing over-reliance on largely pre-determined studies (as the KAP was) over a better understanding of local dynamics.

Data collection, analysis, sharing (performance, accountability) • Definition of meaningful metrics and indicators (or process monitoring) • set up of systems and procedures for data collection and analysis • emphasis on open data. • link to cost / financial analysis	○ Underutilization of the data and research (aggravated by the low quality of reporting) ○ Sharing of data and information openly (notwithstanding, of course, the sensitivities of the information).
Institutions **Direct support: provide assets / resources** • Provision of assets (e.g. machineries) • Provision of financial resources	The project delivered assets as per the plan. Preference was given – upon request of the local organizations – to assets that could not be moved away from the site. Some assets provided (in particular the bins) are at risk of wear and tear. This issue has been discussed with concerned institutions (in particular UNRWA / popular committees, to clarify their responsibilities). It remains to be seen if maintenance / replacement can be achieved in the long term.
Institutions **Strengthen Institutions' capacity for better governance** Promotion of practices for better governance (emphasizing transparency and accountability) – such as: • transparent tendering / contract management; • setup of norms and procedures; • performance management; • feedback mechanisms on quality of the services.	Transparency, accountability, trust in local organization / UNRWA are indeed a challenge in Shu'fat. The agreement on a plan is an important step to start addressing these issues. But more efforts are needed to emphasize individual organizations requirements for transparency / accountability on it: amongst themselves, with the broader community. The following section will discuss, at length, the accountability issue.
institutions 	The project includes some minor activities directed to create and formalize some community groups working on recycling. But, overall, the informal remained a grey area, also little addressed in the research that accompanied the project. Some of the informal waste dealers in the camp– with well organized activities are known by the project staff. However, it is still unclear what is their full chain, and how it will be affected. Many assumptions are still made.

Deal with the informal

- Enable institutions to acknowledge existence of informal initiatives (and of their nature, contributions, needs)
- Consider formalization of informal actors (if adequate) - but recognize that there are intermediate options, and formalization might not be a suitable end goal
- Strive for adherence to health safety requirements or of other guidelines to protect informal actors (or the communities they work within) from risk - as a minimum.

CESVI should give more attention to the informal sector from the start, to check chains, role and relevance in an area. This to:
- **Avoid that the people employed in the informal sector are negatively affected by the programme** – for example losing their livelihood. It might happen, and it is important to have clear "do no harm" strategies to deal with it.
- **Avoid that the informal sector might put the programme at risk**. For example, is it possible to raise awareness of scavengers on how to best coexist with the new system?
- Since CESVI is engaging in the informal sector in other programmes (e.g. in Hebron), a better knowledge of such chains might help to **derive ideas for further action or advocacy**.

Citizens / institutions

Support institutionalization of citizens' organizations

Support institutionalization of citizens' organizations / enterprises through:

- accompaniment of recognition / registration processes;
- setup of bylaws, norms and procedures for accountability;
- strengthening access to other supporting institutions.

The project had invested considerably in working with the local institution, and it agreed MOU and plans with them. Such institutions were already in existence. Yet, beyond the individual institutions, the project requires the formalization of mutual roles and responsibilities.
- formalization of different CBOs roles and complementarities had remained largely undetermined. Clarity of engagements and accountabilities do not seem to be sufficiently strong.
- The solid management plan was agreed by all actors, but in indirect negotiations, mediated by CESVI. Creation of institutional dialogue amongst local actors and UNRVA remain an issue.

At a smaller scale, the project also plans to institutionalize some small groups (e.g. women organizations for business). However, it is not clear what setup will be chosen, and what are the implication. As also mentioned re ⇨ legal assistance, more clarity on the institutionalization process is needed.

Citizens / institutions

Create spaces for participation and accountability

- Support the creation of opportunities, processes, platforms where citizens and their institutions get together for decision making.
- Promote a culture and practices for trust building and accountability amongst citizens and their institutions

There is a communication gap amongst UNRWA and the existing local committees. Information is shared, but through informal channels, rather than clear setups. This project addressed the gap through mediation of CESVI –but had not resulted yet in formal spaces for participation or clear accountability mechanisms. This is further aggravated by the lack of proactive accountability by UNRWA.
Similarly, it is not really clear to what extent the CBOs on the ground are really representative, and to what extent they have spaces for decision making – or at least proper accountability – with the citizens. This is of course a challenging area, given the politics and the tensions in the camp. What options could have supported the creation of spaces for accountability? This topic will be looked in depth as part of the ⇨ main findings.

Mediate: bridge different perspectives and interests

- bridge different perspectives and interests
- bring together diverse actors, towards shared solutions

This emerged as one of the key area of work for CESVI. It is not an explicit one, but – actually – a lot of work has gone in bringing together the key stakeholders of the project! So, it is worth highlighting.

The task has been made more difficult by the challenges in the participation process: it had reached a point where the length of engagement has disheartened participants, and CESVI had to rebuild buy in the project and trust.

- Mediation is a hidden but very important role, and it is also linked to the quality of participation and accountability. As a core component of the programme, it would be worth, for CESVI, to invest in the soft skills needed to staff for working on it (e.g. conflict management)

Motivate: incentives, leverages

- Ensure that people, institutions, are motivated to improve their practices, to collaborate more strongly.
- Capture and show effectively decisions, and results (including intermediary actions) to demonstrate that change is happening.
- The other side of the medals is to consider using sanctions (negative incentives): "sticks or carrots?"

Issues of incentives / motivation appeared often in the discussion, and this motivated us to add a key activity to emphasize it.

- **A system of incentives / sanctions** is key for the uptake of any system, and needs to be properly discussed
- **Avoid paternalism**. We discovered, in our conversations, that paternalism can easily creep in. This was evidence when discussing the awareness campaign. It is important that motivation might already exist, and it is important to design messages / initiatives to further encourage it.
- **Make gains and positive practice visible.** Capacity to capture and share positive changes / models, make people clearly aware of improvement is a positive leverage to motivation worth addressing.

Hands-on activities

- Supporting citizens in direct action (also by providing them means and encouragement to engage).

Hands on activities refer to contribution – re: resources, work – of citizens. This area has been little leveraged.

- **Build in options for citizens engagement – rather than just contracting out work.** The project included 3 hotspots, areas to requalify, but the final arrangement has been to contract them out – rather than also think them as opportunities for citizens involvement in the work
- **Start small and manageable.** The choice of 3 major hotspot, and late in the programme, did not allow to test lighter options for the involvement of people (e.g. small spots were mobilization of volunteers could have been leveraged). There are examples in Shu'fat of neighbourhood beautification with direct involvement of citizens, which could have been built on.

The project invested a lot in participation for decision making, but ultimately the citizens involved were mostly existing institutions (e.g. CBOs/local committees). And it was also unclear, to them, what decision making power they ultimately had.

This is of course fine – it is very possible to have diverse levels of participation for different groups – and prioritize some.

Support citizens' participation in decision making

- Set up processes whereby citizens and organizations – directly or through their representatives – can have a say in decision making.
- Ensure that people are aware of their right and their role in decision making.
- Allow people to make informed decisions and to account for them.

But it is then important to be clear about the limits of participation, to avoid raising expectations, and to generate proper accountabilities. This should be clearer from the outset: Participation, with whom? This aspect will be looked into more closely in the main findings.

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
citizens

Strengthening citizens' groups and organizations

Strengthening capacity of citizens to work together, in groups and organizations, in diverse ways, such as:

- Promoting volunteerism
- Supporting teamwork and collaboration
- Sharing practices for effective group setup and action
- Provided needed material resources and capacities.

This point refers to the capacity and willingness of people / groups to work together. It builds on the understanding that social / cooperation skills are not a given and need to be strengthened.

Overall, despite the investment in participation, it seems that time was spent more in consultations than in strengthening the capacities of the groups taking part in it. More support could have been given:

- **Within groups:** to support their capacity to involve volunteers, to broaden their audience, to better communicate with the whole community. For many groups "how to involve people" – and specifically on solid waste – remained a question mark. The representativeness of such group and the capacity to involve their communities does not seem to have been transformed by the project.
- **Across groups**: the project brought together diverse organizations, and also organized issue based working groups. But it does not seem to have strengthened their capacity to work together and collaborate / coordinate

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citizens

Partnership and collaboration with civil society orgs happened at different levels:

- **The partnership amongst implementing organizations** (CESVI/OVERSEAS). The two organizations, despite sharing an office, had less collaboration than the project demanded. They had tended to

Work in partnership and collaboration with civil society organizations
 	
• Coordination and collaboration – with other civil society organization.
• Establishment of partnerships for project management.
	run activities independently, which would have required much more coordination.
	  ○ **Rethink the consortium setup**: what can be run independently? What need to be co-lead? Mechanises for coordination should be strengthened.
	
	• **The partnership with local organizations in camp**. CESVI staff, in retrospective, shared that capacities of local organizations have been probably underestimated in the process. They have been accompanied, but never seen as main actors- Which is something that these organizations ultimately resented.
	  ○ *Incremental* **mechanisms for sharing decision making power / strengthening coordination should be envisaged** (e.g. options to manage budget, identifying subset of activities to delegate). Some attempts are made now – e.g. through the hotspots – which are however proving challenging: too much budget was released all of a sudden, and it became a-hard-to-control process, hijacked by local organizations. A more incremental approach (from limited to larger delegation) might have helped.
	
	• **Other civil society organizations active in the camp.** CESVI reflected on the opportunity to link up with other organizations active in the camp. For example, they are aware that Save the Children had moved out of Shu'fat after encountering many challenges (CESVI is now setting activities in places where the ones by Save were not sustained)
	  ○ Learning from other organizations experience, creating a common front and approach with like-minded organization will matter

Technical / citizens **Identify and share positive knowledge, practices** • identify individuals/groups strong applied knowledge and insights: e.g. people who have already run successful actions or programmes • identify positive behaviours, active change makers / early adopters and • ensure that their knowledge is shared (e.g. by supporting them in having an active role, by organizing sharing / exchange visits) • support abilities to champion such expertise and practices.	This card was inserted whilst discussing the project. It emerged that CESVI staff are aware of positive practices happening in Palestine, worth sharing. However there has not been yet a practice of learning exchanges, or to invite and present positive practices. ⇨ CESVI should invest more in identifying champions and positive examples worth sharing. And support learning exchanges. On one side, this would be a rewarding recognition for the champions, of their role. On the other side, this could obviously concretely help other actors to emulate them.
Technical / citizens 	Awareness raising largely falls under OVERSEAS tasks, and the separation of activities created a disconnect. ○ **Coordinate work on awareness raising.** A strong awareness raising is clearly essential for the success of the programme, but there has been so far very little discussion about how to integrate awareness raising with the new plan.

Raise Awareness

- Improve awareness of citizens about solid waste management / environmental health (the purpose, the practices) by sharing technically sound information.

The work on awareness raising is set to mainly happen at the end of the programme – to promote the new system.

- **Ensure swift integration of awareness raising and implementation**. But to date there was still little integration amongst the awareness raising components and the plan – and the planning of the campaign is late. An issue that needs to be rapidly addressed. The evaluation had created spaces to kick-start this discussion.
- **Consider longer term / incremental work on awareness raising in future programmes.** This has also reduced opportunities to raise incrementally awareness on solid waste, - through the promotion of participatory initiatives, through the encouragement of good practices possible also before the plan (for example "do not drag your bags!". Work on awareness could have also been linked with qualitative assessment / piloting of options.
- **Embed awareness components in consultative actions**. CESVI had recently embedded awareness building components in its most recent survey: it lead practical discussions showing the bins that will be used to people. In this way, information about the new plan could start to trickle and be discussed one to one. Integrating awareness raising seamlessly into other activities is certainly a good practice.

Key areas for action

Participation

Be clear on what participation you seek, by whom. And be coherent with it.

The project invested a lot in participation. It delegated the setup of an extensive participation process to an external consultancy – in charge of data collection and of facilitating engagement amongst different stakeholders (citizens, local committees, UNRWA). But getting to a shared plan through such process proved problematic and stretched too long. Participants were alienated. Tensions with the consultancy emerged, and the collaboration was eventually phased out. Overseas was also in charge of participatory activities to accompany the project, but substantial ones (e.g. awareness raising / communication) were still to start. CESVI has now retaken control of the process. A plan has finally been set up – and agreed by the major player. Its implementation is now due to start. Procurement is underway. Looking back at participation – given the investment in it by the project – is crucial to derive needed lessons learnt for CESVI.

Clarity: What level of participation is expected? (the participation ladder)

8	Citizen Control	Citizen Power
7	Delegated Power	
6	Partnership	
5	Placation	Tokenism
4	Consultation	
3	Informing	
2	Therapy	Nonparticipation
1	Manipulation	

The previous evaluation presented the "participation ladder". It also highlighted some steps along it, the most meaningful ones for CESVI activities:

- Information sharing / consultation
- Participation in decision making
- Partnerships

Aside the participation ladder, "Hands on activities" were also highlighted. They are an important facet of participation, cross cutting amongst all steps (hands on activities can be linked to activities at all steps).

Participation remained a broad idea within CESVI, little articulated. The evaluation helped to pinpoint which steps on the ladder are most significant for CESVI. But even a small number steps can still give a lot of latitude: hence the importance, for CESVI, to clarify what participation it seeks, by whom. Also, project managers, staff, project partners **had different understanding of what participation should be**. Some favoured low levels of participation (as information). Others leaned towards more in depth involvement. A process to bring on board all stakeholders to agree (or at least share) clarity on the participation sought within the project matters.

Overall, the programme largely understood **participation as consultation**. Local community groups were extensively involved, but never sat at the decision table with the big players (e.g. UNRWA). They could present their issues, make demands. Issues and concerns could emerge, but the final plan was largely the result of a mediation by CESVI – which played middleperson. The process remained consultative as it did not help shifting power, transforming accountabilities, creating new forums for discussion. The decision-making process was largely retained by UNRWA.
Within "consultation" different approaches were practiced:

- **Extractive consultation**, such as the consultations in KAPs: largely pre-determined and based on questionnaires. With little spaces to gather input from participants beyond the blueprint. As highlighted later on, in the section on evidence collection, lighter options should be considered before embarking in extensive studies.
- **Dialogue.** Some modalities involved extensive interaction / discussions – for example, consultations of Working Groups / local committees. Consultation stretched for long. But this become too demanding for participants (also in light of the limited outcomes) and generated participation fatigue.

Dialogue lead to an involvement which is borderline with engagement in decision making, but it **never become participation in decision making by design.** This would have involved devolving power of decision to the organizations in the camp – or at least creating spaces where this could happen. It appears that the Studio Azue – the external consultancy - would have wanted to achieve this, or at

least to move decisively in this direction, but it was not seen as an adequate goal by CESVI and UNRWA. Part of the tension that emerged also derive from these conflicting stances. If and to what extent CESVI should aims at making participation a goal within its projects remain to be discussed (see the next paragraph). But, whatever the position of the organization, the stance should be clearer to all parties.

On another front, **Overseas was also in charge of participatory activities** – but this stream of activities was discontinued. Informants in the camp lamented that working groups / teachers become depressed by lack of action and follow up and started complaining. As we visited the camp, it was clear that discontinuity in participation had had put people off also on this front.

Was participation the name of the game?

For some NGOs, participation (and empowerment through participation) is an end in itself. For them, working on services is a means through which strengthen the power and the rights of citizens. This, however, does not seem to be the case of CESVI, more oriented to put "improved services" as the higher goal.
If this is the case, the vision of participation was probably too ambitious from the start. **What was depicted as a "participation" process should have been probably reframed as "strengthening - through consultation - good governance of the solid management system"**.
It is perfectly fine, for an organization, to stop at "simply" improving consultation or transparency – rather than jumping at putting citizens in the driving seat. And it would be understandable given the challenges and the stakes of the solid waste management in Shu'fat – vis à vis UNRWA. But this should then be clear to all players. It is therefore suggested that CESVI becomes more realistic about the goals, processes and mechanisms for participation of solid waste management systems – and align it to its vision of their governance. This shall involve a stronger understanding of accountability, and about the "good enough" level of engagement expected.

As one participant put it: "*The approach of the consultancy would work with ministry and municipalities: it would work if you want to invest on a 20 years scale, and if it is followed up in the long term. Then you need to build interactions amongst different bodies. It was not suitable for the situation in the camp*".

Beyond the setup of the system, CESVI also engaged in other activities in the area. Also in this case it never become clear if they were a goal in itself (e.g.: having a hotspot), or a means (improve the capacity of citizens to take decisions within smaller projects / to get engaged for their sustainability). **Within smaller projects, options for participation could have probably be explored.** At this level, participation could challenge issues of representativeness of the local bodies (are they capable to inform and involve citizens about their projects?) and could also help to overcome inertia (can opportunities for citizens willing to be active be found?). For example, modalities for participatory planning of rooftops (more consultation to gather ideas, decision making events were people could vote or chose alternatives…) could have been designed as powerful means to involve citizens and model engagement.

Who is (should be) involved?

A participatory approach needs clarify about *who should be involved, in what*. A "community" is not a homogenous body, and the same project might well choose to involve different groups in different ways. What matters is that this is clear, and that there are clear mechanisms of accountability and transparency about it. **The risk is, otherwise, to "do harm":** alienating part of the community, being perceived as a non-neutral actor, exacerbating local conflict.

Restricted or broad participation? The participation in the project ultimately tended to involve existing local institutions (the Popular committee / the CBOs) rather than the broader community in Shu'fat. Only a very limited number of key informants were consulted beyond the CBOs by Studio Azue (for example, some local sheiks, a few notables). Overall a very small number of people were involved, largely on volunteering basis. For example, the working groups created involved from 3 to 10 people, in weekly meetings. Neighbourhood committees were invited, but soon backed up seeing lack of results: participatory mechanisms should be clear about what motivation /support different groups need to participate! This stance – involving extensively few actors - is justified by practical concerns (the need to keep participation manageable) and when the goal is to strengthen involvement of established bodies and their capacity to coordinate and work together. The downside is that the interface amongst them and other citizens is not acted upon. This can be problematic where the

representativeness of local institution is questionable (as was the case in Shu'fat). UNRWA, for example, had then tended to discard their voice and input on representativeness grounds.

Including diverse groups. Overall the participation mechanisms seem to have done little to reach out vulnerable / marginalized groups, and/or these people beyond the existing local power bubble. The project involved Women, Children, Youth committees. But, in the end, the consultative mechanisms did little to portray and disaggregate specific needs / capacities of women, children, youth. Or to identify vulnerable groups. Even information gathering activities did little to overcome this: very little space to explore local dynamics bottom up, or to get insights from diverse groups – including groups of interest for the project, such as informal waste managers / collectors.

Different degrees of participation might coexist. But this need to be clear. Different levels of participation might coexist. For example, participation in decision making could be designed to only actively involve local committees. And the general population might then simply be involved through "communication of information" or lighter consultation activities. But this should be clear.

Participation does not stop at "talking"

The participation process was a lengthy one, and two years within the project, it had little to show. This had frustrated the people involved, and even creating risk and mistrust ("you talk and not deliver" or "the local committees are making deals that do not benefit people"). Motivation and engagement reduced. The way in which participation is supported should definitely be reconsidered.

The options for participation were somehow limited: consultations were
- **largely based on discussions** – leavening people with a sense of endless discussions. "*It become a "documentary": we were having meetings and then document that there was a meeting. We made CESVI aware of it many times".*
- **on pre-determined surveys**. There was very little evidence of other channels to reach the broader population

Participation is much more than talking. Participation is about engaging people through a range of options, which were lacking in the process. There are now endless techniques and approaches for decision making / community engagement. And many spaces and opportunities for participation and for sharing information existed – which were not tackled. For example:
- **Small scale planning for the "hotspots"** could have been done with community workshops, creating events to present and vote projects, engaging youth and children in activities to generate ideas or commitments, or along the awareness campaign, but there was no evidence of it.
- The **environmental educators have been largely a missed opportunity**. They are a very dynamic group of people, with many ideas for engagement and willing to make things move. But they had little space to energize the community. They were bogged down in meetings and bureaucracy and had little opportunity for action. One environmental worker got to the point of paying, of its own pocket, for garbage bins to do demonstrations in school. But delays in project school activities had frustrated the teachers and little was achieved.
- **Neighbourhood committees** were also a missed opportunity. The plan was presented to them. "*At the beginning they came, attended meetings. After 2 meetings people got bored. It was only meetings, nothing else…"*
- Even **surveys and data gathering can offer options**! CESVI recently started checking information collected in previous surveys and did so bringing a bin. This lead to much more real conversation about the new system. It is a good example of how data gathering, consultation, awareness raising, motivation building could seamlessly integrate.

Another challenge was that residents of Shu'fat, for a long time did not see anything more than "talking". The goal of the planning process (having a strategy) was somehow too big and abstract.

- **Build up participation, step by step.** Since the process of setting a plan was obviously a long and hard one, could the programme had built opportunity for participation aside it? More manageable activities along the way (engagement in an information campaign, engagement in work for the hotspots, support to actions by the neighbourhood committees, micro pilot initiatives with the support of the environmental educators) might have built a practice of participation, and the understanding that participation leads to results. Such activities, instead, have been postponed towards the end of the project, bogging people with things to do, and missing opportunities to build engagement.

Hotspots: a missed opportunity for early action and participation.

In the Child centre the hotspot will be planned by an architect. When we checked how and to what extent children will be involved and consulted, there was no idea to do so. Yet possibilities are endless, which 1) would sensitize children to the importance of participation; 2) motivate them to engage – and make them possibly champion of change; 3) listen to their voice – which would be very important in empower actors always removed by any decision-making process.
There are many examples – including in Palestine! – of how children participation can be achieved and of its benefits. The same of course apply to the other centres and hotspot realized by the project- which had equally resulted in minimal participation / appreciation of the importance to involve citizens.
The creation of a roof garden for women, for example, could have created a physical place where women could have been better involved in awareness / consultation, at a much earlier stage.

- **Create tangible results.** The purpose of the participation process was of course tangible change, but this was too far down the line for people to see it. As a participant to the process put it: "*People expected real changes. The process was addressing something that was too abstract (the strategy) rather the problems that mattered to them. People needed to see something done on the ground. When are we going to see some results?".* The way forward could have been 1) better linkages of the strategic process with other activities (see the point above); 2) stronger capacity to show and communicate "soft results". Rather than giving participants the feeling that meetings were all the same, workshops could have been designed to be more clearly memorable (e.g. a calendar of thematic workshops, well-advertised); results could have been better tracked (e.g. capturing timelines, generating newsletters, using social media). This aspect was quite poor, as it will be further discussed in the accountability / evidence collection section.

Strengthen conflict management / mediation skills

All the actors consulted recognized that there were real challenges in putting a consultative process in motion, given the complexities of the camp. Tensions emerged in the process, which jeopardized it Relationships amongst the consultancy and some local groups also become tense. In the end CESVI saw no other solution that terminating the collaboration and moving to manage directly relations with the communities. All these challenges were probably addressed too late, but local stakeholders nevertheless expressed confidence that the project is now on better tracks.

In our discussion on the theory of change we understood that "mediation" is a key, but often forgotten skill. The project rests on mediation, and require diverse mediation skills:
- The **mediation / facilitation skills needed to deal with a community** – and the different interests within it. These would be largely in the toolbox of a community facilitator. Local staff demonstrated sensitivity to this, but of course could have benefitted from an investment in building further their capacities on it.
- The **negotiation capacities for bringing institutions to agree on a course of action**. In Shu'fat, CESVI had to involve local institutions (often highly politicized) and large governmental or international bodies (equally politicized and also highly bureaucratized). Navigating this has been a challenge, and there were some ingenuities in the process (e.g. too much faith, on the consultancy side, that UNRWA could easily adapt and bend its process and procedures).
- All this also need to be matched by strong **conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution skills**, given the volatility of the camp. Some CBOs resented that problematic actors were also contacted in the process and that this had created problems. It was hard to pinpoint the underlying story, but there have been clearly tensions in the process. Conflict sensitivity and conflict management skills might help to better navigate these challenges: on one side, limited representativeness of the local institution – it is important to have brought other people on board. On the other, this should not happen haphazardly, but through a gradual and sustained effort to improve accountability.

Staff so far has been very capable to walk a thin, complicated line. But CESVI might consider **additional coaching on mediation /negotiation/conflict resolution skills for future projects** – since similar challenges will repeat. Capacity to lead strong negotiation – for an organization which is willing to also position itself as a key actor on solid waste management also at the national level, could be a strong asset.

The process promoted a very high "participation" by local committees and actors. Yet, what "participation" was and involved remained unclear. And the participation process was challenging. A **plan was finally agreed on – which is of course very positive**, also because this plan does mediate amongst needs and interest of different actors, hard to bring together. This is definitely a strong success. But the cost of participation, in terms of resources invested by the project, time and engagement by many actors, loss of motivation and trust has been too high.

The points above had already highlighted many issues that will need to be tackled to define what type of participation is sought and how to better support it. But one higher level question still lingers: **can participation be delegated by CESVI?** The project was designed

- **assuming close linkages with a group of consultants**, which were involved in the assessment and design (under a different country director). Delays in approval, changes in the team and in the conditions on the ground (for example, places identified as potential hotspots were not available) meant that the project was implemented under very different circumstances.
- **including a partnership with Overseas –** largely in charge with community level activities. However, the little coordination amongst Overseas and CESVI reduced the synergies amongst the community activities and the generation of the plan.

All the elements of participation ended up being contracted out – and without a clear strategy of participation and management oversight, to a point where it was not clear what CESVI role was. This created disconnections and challenges in the project. Who "owned" and stirred the participation process (CESVI? The consultancy?) remained unclear, and this created tensions that eventually alienated participants and resulted in the termination of the consultancy.

Since participation is a defining component of a social change project, it cannot be simply delegated out. Elements of the process can be contracted out, but not the full package. It is important to

- **retain strategic control of what participation is.** Participation can be many things… "What participation" should be strategically defined by CESVI.
- **Manage coordination** so that participation – and activities leading to it – are fully integrated. In this case key elements such as the awareness raising components ultimately failed to link to the project.

In future programmes, be weary of sub-contracting participation. Subcontracting fully participation – as it was the case in the programme - is not advisable: participation is not "one more activity", but the way in which a programme is run. As such, it cannot be delegated, but it should be seen as a core commitment, and monitored. It is however possible to:

- **subcontract specific activities**, within a participation strategy (e.g. the facilitation of a workshop, a communication initiative**).**
- **Bring** in participation expertise (e.g. training, capacity building) might also help to strengthen CESVI approaches -given that participation is not a strong component but only if this coherently fits with the overall programme.

- **Harmonize understanding of participation amongst stakeholders and be clear about the participation level to achieve.** CESVI should be clearer about the flavour and degree of participation it seeks, and question if it has realistically the needed capacity to deliver on it. The project made an overoptimistic assessment of capacities and attitudes towards participation the stakeholders involved (including CESVI itself!).
- **Balance cost/benefits:** Overall the investment in participation consultation (and the effort required to participants) was too much compared with the outcomes. Participation processes will require to more realistically balance efforts and rewards.
- **Services or participation?** CESVI should better consider how to balance "service delivery" and "empowerment of citizens". This has been a thorny issue for many organizations engaging in rights-based approach. CESVI tends to lean on the service side (And it should then invest in improving governance trough transparency and accountability). But it should not excessively limit its role in building participation
- **Map stakeholders, question representativeness.** At the community level, the project mainly involved the local committees, even it doubled their representativeness. The paradox was, on one side, to potentially strengthen their power further. On the other, to never fully trust their engagement. As the next session will discuss, representativeness challenges need to be balanced by a strong work on accountability / transparency.
- **Inclusion and diversity.** The project did little to get perspective from diverse groups. Even if local CBOs were involved, very little is known about gender / age / income dynamics

relevant for solid waste management.
- **Techniques for participation.** Invest in capacities for participation, beyond "participation as talking and having conventional meetings".
- **Incremental, tangible achievements.** Ensure a clear road map of participatory processes, bringing in tangible gains early on, to build interest and buy in in the process.
- **Capacity for mediation and negotiation.** Despite some glitches by the consultancy / Overseas CESVI had now demonstrated strong capacities to mediation and negotiation. They are however highly dependent on the personal capacity of staff. Given the willingness of CESVI to become a primary actor in solid waste management, investment in structuring its mediation and negotiation skills – choosing for example methodologies to this end - could be useful.
- **Retain, do not delegate the strategic and overall management of participation.** Is an expertise in participation something than can be delegated to a consultant? Or left out to a partner organization, with little coordination? The evaluation believes that participation is such a central theme that requires much closer overseeing. Of course, external support can be used to improve design of participatory mechanisms or help to facilitate it. But if the process is not fully owned by the organization, it creates disconnects within the project which affect deeply its quality.

Accountability

Strong accountability strengthens systems

Accountability is a key concern when improving the management of a service. The capacity to serve and respond to citizens, its ownership and sustainability largely depend on it. A solid participation process must ultimately lead to stronger accountability. Yet **accountability never got prominence in the project. It is not a concept owned by CESVI or promoted by its partners**. To address this, during the evaluation, we held a short training session for CESVI staff: by clarifying what is accountability – and why it matters, we also ensured that findings about accountability could be better understood.

What is accountability?
Accountability was presented as "*a good promise, which is kept*". This involves:

1. **Understanding that accountability is a process**. There is a promise, but there is also a time before it (How did the promise came about?) and after (how will the promise be kept in check? How will the promise change and adapt?). The promise also requires clarity of spaces (where can the promise be discussed? What is its remit?)
2. **Looking at different components**. Accountability requires *appropriate participation mechanisms* (how are people getting together in making the process?), *inclusion* (who is involved in the promise?), *clarity of requirements*, *communication* (how will the promise shared, and how will the shortcomings feedback?). Accountability can then become a process of clarifying mutual responsibilities, far beyond bureaucratic requirements.
3. **Set for what is "good enough" in the circumstances.** Higher degrees of accountability might not be realistic in a given setup – for example where the starting point is low. And it is also possible to negotiate diverse accountabilities with diverse people (for example, higher accountability to local institutions, lower to others).

4. **Considering power.** The challenge of accountability is to make a promise set and respected even when players have different degrees of power. Good governance and citizenships are precisely about that. Accountability brings in issues of representativeness, power, voice.

The relation amongst accountability and participation is a very close one. A focus on accountability can ensure that a weak participation process can be at least strengthened through transparency. For example, being open about limitations re: the representativeness of these involved is a first step to create conditions for broader engagement. Vice versa, accountability can be improved by strengthening modalities of participation. Overall it emerged that **the model of participation chosen by CESVI was not tied into accountability**. There was accountability – as the process ultimately resulted into a shared plan, agreed by the diverse stakeholders involved. But:

- **When "making the promise", decision-making was hard to track.** The process involved many documented meetings / engagements. But the minutes did not even reach back to the environmental educators! There was not a clear mechanism to keep track on "what has been decided" step by step, and to share it.

- **Transparency remained low**. Mechanisms for informing / involving the local community of the ongoing process have been really limited. Apart from limited use of social media (some project related events were posted on the Facebook page of the popular committees) there was really little to show. Even people close to the project (UNRWA staff, Environmental Educators) – are not fully sure of what the plan entails, neither they have reference copies. It will be possible to address this issue through the awareness campaign: it will be then essential that it does not stop at telling people "how to handle the bins", but becomes an opportunity to create accountability on the system.
- **Spaces for mutual accountability have not been created**. Mediation and negotiations were driven by **CESVI / the consultancy.** It is unclear what spaces community and their institutions can now use to bring the engagement forward, to check adherence to the plan, to discuss adaptation: around what table can the key stakeholder meet?
- **Mechanisms to strengthen accountability within the plan have not been discussed**. It is not clear how the plan will be kept in check. What mechanisms exist to get information about the plan? To give feedback (and get an answer)? The plan does not make explicit needed accountability measures.
- **Issues of representativeness have been little discussed**. The popular committee is an elected body, but the other committees are not. Who do they really represent? Who is left out? What are the consequences the accountability towards citizens? Unclear representativeness of these institution is also aggravated by their opacity. Yet little effort was made to stimulate better accountability practices by the institutions involved in the project (bot UNRWA/ local CBOs).
- **Mistrust has not been tackled**. The context in Shu'fat is a challenging one, with many rivalries and endemic lack of trust. In such context, a culture of accountability is an important asset to share.

Paradoxically, lack of accountability about solid waste management systems had a positive twist. Another project was ongoing, which generated improvement in solid waste management. Some people – including neighbourhood committee representatives! – gave credit to CESVI programme for it. So, the risk of discontent because of delays in the implementation were somehow lessened as the positive effects of the other project materialized. This, however, shows an issue of accountability, as it was not really clear who was doing what, even to people quite closely involved in community affairs.

Clarity of roles and responsibilities.

- **Accountability to constituency / clients**: each organization should be accountable to its mandate and constituency – and have clear mechanisms to do so. However, the organizations involved in the programme, are quite opaque – as indicated when highlighting issues of representativeness. What role could/should have had the project in strengthening it? Discussing the setup of feedback mechanisms might have been a step in this direction.
- **Mutual accountability**: Clarity of roles and responsibilities – as well as expectations / "room for manoeuvre" of each organization is fundamental to create mutual accountability. (UNRWA and CBOs started from positions of mutual mistrust – which were never really overcome. Building and strengthening mutual accountabilities / clarifying positions could have been a useful step to bring them together in dialogue. One of the main challenges for the project was, for example, that the position of UNRWA – and what it could / could not do because of its bureaucracy and role - was not really clear. The risk has been to set unrealistic / false expectations which created some misunderstanding amongst CESVI (and the consultancy)/UNRWA/and community institutions.

Examples of tools that can be used to strengthen accountability on role and responsibilities include:

- **Living MOUs**: MOUs were signed with organizations (in English / translated in Arabic) at the beginning of the project. They were standard ones, highlighting project goals. However, signatories were not always clear of what the MOU involved: at that point in time, it was nothing more than a piece of paper in a folder. As one representative of UNRWA put it "*the MOU was a standard one, and it was actually hard to understand what they were set to achieve together*". It did not become a living reference, neither he was accompanied by an owned and growing understanding on roles and responsibilities for solid waste management improvement. Beyond accountability, this seems to have also reduced potential for engagement. For example, the youth club did not really feel they had a role on solid waste management: they were mainly interested in getting direct outcomes from the project (i.e. a roof garden). When we asked: "what can the youth club do to improve solid waste management", not much initially emerged! When prompted, ideas emerged, which apparently had not been discussed before (e.g. engaging local champions in motivating people, soliciting users to keeping the playground clean...). Being accountable helps to feel responsible and involved.
- **Service charters**. A service charter – designed for broad communication – would help to clarify to citizens what to expect, from whom, and how to go about demanding what is promised. The

process of setting the service charter would be also an opportunity to clarify responsibilities about the plan and set some loose ends. If institution feel that they can be put on their toes by citizens, they shall become more responsive.

- **Feedback systems**. The only attempt at strengthening feedback was a box was put inside the Popular Committee building. But it seems a tokenistic feature: it is not clear who should access, for what, what mechanisms are in place to gather and respond to feedback. Feedback systems are much more than a box! They are about providing people with the information they need, and for channels to take action (and get a response) when what is promised is not maintained. Some channels amongst UNRWA and citizens exist but are not formalized. UNRWA managers, for example, showed that some citizens have their mobile phones, and sent them videos denouncing challenges. The UNRWA foreman also acts as an interface amongst citizens and UNRWA, and sweepers felt citizens can put them under pressure. However, this does not suffice because: 1) these systems are informal, and not official channels; 2) they are not for all citizens, and 3) there are no ways to bypass local actors and reach out for independent response. CESVI is aware that independent external bodies are setting hotlines. Linking up with such systems might be more sustainable than trying to create project-based ones.

Sharing data and clear, exhaustive information is a core requirement of accountability. This aspect was quite weak in the process. For example, working groups were set to look at different issues, but the **records of working group work were little accessible**: reports, documentation, timelines were not even available to the environmental educators. So, it **is hard to track how decisions came about**. At the very beginning of the project, email exchanges helped to keep track, but this stopped. Some institutions lamented that **the consultancy had never set a strong communication system**. Some efforts were recently made – when revising the plan and the studies, in involving more local actors. For example, the project manager had discussions with the environmental educators about the plan, gathering feedback.

The project had people on the ground which could have supported communication for accountability. Yet the local **environmental educators shared that they were in a difficult position**: people asked them all the time about the state of the project – and they were not always capable to give them informed answers. For example, they could not explain why the engagement with schools was discontinued. The rationale for it – according to Overseas was the unsatisfactory quality of the training, but this message / the alternative course of action never really reached the teachers. They were left frustrated as nothing happened, and no response was given to their proposals.

Restitution mechanisms are very important in strengthening accountability. Yet many people were unaware of what was captured / done with their input. It is overall **unclear to what extent it was an issue of "poor restitution" or "poor communication"** Probably a mix of both: in some cases, information was simply not shared. But when it was (for example re MOU, presentations of plans"…) it was done in formats that tended to remain "paperwork" or presentations that were not memorable. It is therefore important 1) to ensure that information is shared and 2) to do so creatively, to ensure that needed commitment, ownership, use… are actually achieved. In the course of the evaluation, we looked at tools which might have improved communication – such as blogs, timelines. And we had positive feedback about these options, as we presented them to local stakeholders.

Key learning and way forward

- **Accountability must be a primary concern when negotiating and designing a solid waste management system**. Yet CESVI now lack a clear understanding of the concept, and tools and practices to address it. This is an important gap that need to be addressed.
- **Accountability can be strengthened through different tools and approaches.** Some, such as service charters, set up of feedback mechanisms – can still be set within the programme.
- **Awareness raising / communication initiatives** will have a key role in creating accountability. It is therefore key that such initiatives also consider accountability – and do not stop at sharing "how to" messages.

Rethinking data gathering, rethinking monitoring

In the evaluation we spent a considerable amount of time to rethink the monitoring system so that it could become also a tool of open information and accountability. Should information about change only be stored in organization's computer? Or should it rather be archived and shared to also become an opportunity for communication and accountability? For example: a meeting with a local committee

might just have minutes buried in CESVI computer and be "counted" to become an indicator in a report for donors…. Or it could be shared on a project blog (with a picture, an outline of the topic discussed, a summary of the decision taken) and also become "newsworthy", ready to be further shared – and enabling stakeholders to track decisions. Possibilities to improve data gathering/analysis and its use are endless, and needed, because:

- **Tracking of change has been poor, and poorly shared.** As mentioned, the **process and roadmap for change has been poorly tracked**. For example, participants in Working Groups were neither aware about the final plan, nor of the state of the art or other intermediary decisions. Lack of monitoring system was for example already evident in the local office in Shu'fat. The environmental educators could not access documentation, neither they were certain of the status of the documents /plans they have been working on. There was no filing mechanism (in folders or online), neither tools for tracking change timelines, progress status…They however signalled some recent improvement, such as the investment in weekly discussions of the plan.
- **Investment in data collection did not pay off.** And, whilst there was a lot of investment in studies and analysis very little of it proved actually useful to inform and stir change.

Discussions held throughout the evaluation process show that **CESVI would be keen to start improving its monitoring system – and would have capacities to do so**. And design a system that does not stop at "gathering information for reporting" but tries to **link evidence collection to use in communication, accountability, adaptive management**.

As CESVI re-establishes its monitoring system, it should be ambitious and use it as an opportunity to demonstrate **that a more effective way to monitor is possible**. Staff is dynamic and appreciate a vision of monitoring that leverage new tools and possibilities to deeply inform the process of change, help to adapt it, and bring along other stakeholders through a more solid process of information sharing and evidence-based adaptation.

Allow people to see (invisible) progress

"*One and half year for nothing*": this was how the participatory process was defined. However, was it really nothing? A lot has been achieved – albeit in a frustratingly long time: a plan consolidated, understanding created. The process was definitely too slow and to cumbersome. But it was also really poor at capture "soft" achievements along the way. Participatory engagements, where the goal is not only to "deliver things" but also to "have more effective management and governance" should monitor such "soft" components: such as a stronger network, the quality of the agreements, the trust built. Monitoring – by making visible and sharing results - can become a strong allied in strengthening commitment to participation.

- **Strengthen capacity to monitor process:** Decisions have been taken. Relationships strengthened. Awareness was increased amongst these engaging. Yet none of that was captured / communicated, apart from occasional posts published by the Popular Committee, and later in the project. It is important to shift from *result* indicators only to timelines and *process* indicators. From emphasis only on *hard* results to capacity to appreciate *soft* changes. It is useful to have a "communication / storytelling mind-set" when shifting to process monitoring. It is about building a narrative of change, of making visible the chain of events which punctuated achievements of change: a habit that the log-frame tends to discourage.
- **If you have nothing to show, you have a problem.** If progress remain invisible for too long, this is a sign that the process has been poorly planned. A roadmap needs to be interspersed by small gains and changes. If you monitor discontent on lack of results, it is urgent to go back at the drawing table. As already mentioned, the programme had budget for small interventions which might have created visible outcomes (for example roof gardens, sensitization in schools). They came too late, and too little linked to the broad roadmap to create a momentum for change.
- **Monitor risk.** There are 2 main reasons to monitor risk: to ensure that it does not turn into disaster (risk management). And to ensure that – if disaster does not materialize – people can recognize their work in averting risk! Often simply allowing something to happen – which could have gone badly wrong (e.g. bringing together conflictual parties), is something worth celebrating. CESVI was conscious of risk, but the risk awareness and monitoring component does not come up strongly in planning and monitoring.

Link evidence to use

The project had invested considerably in analysis, and this is one of its strong points. Also, local community members appreciated the importance of the information. *The surveys were all good, in different ways. There was no study done before: there was zero information before! The analysis is professional… but it was not much useful for the project. Some other information is useful, for*

example we understood how many bins we need. We might use all this information for other interventions, to have scientific documentation about the place. And to contact other donors".
However, when compared with the investment in collecting and revising data, analysis was not used enough. Studies where a lot of investment went (such as the KAP) proved ultimately less useful than more agile analysis (such as the estimates of local population).

- **Contextualize analysis.** The KAP study was largely built on pre-established questionnaires, which provided little usable data on local dynamics. A qualitative study beforehand might have helped to identify which numbers, which questions really mattered.
- **Look at dynamics – and disaggregation.** In line with the emphasis on "processes", it is key to get insights about existing dynamics. Hence the need for analysis which better capture barriers and options for change. Another limitation of the existing studies was lack of disaggregation (by neighbourhood, by type of respondent) and therefore lacked the potential to explore more detailed patterns and options (e.g. what is the added value of involving children? What could they do?). We tried, as part of the evaluation, to look into the raw data with tableau. Some additional insight emerged, but, overall, it was confirmed that the questions were too generic and little adapted to understand what was worth knowing.
- **Create more accountability and ownership of research**. Despite a lot of investment in the KAP, and also involvement of key actors in revising it (with chapter by chapter editing), the evidence produced never got to be owned and relevant. On the contrary, actors (e.g. UNRWA) lamented that they do not know if and how their input was taken into account. Presentations were offered, but outcomes were not memorable / remembered by the people we met.
- **Consider option to make research and awareness interact.** Move from extractive models of research (e.g. questionnaires) to options which also contribute to awareness raising. Such move has started: *"In the* last *2 months of work (since the survey of the bin) people could start imagining how the situation can improve. This is influencing their mind-set. This came late… but people are starting to think. They started this new survey started, talking door to door. People are becoming interested.* Participatory techniques are precisely about this: ensuring that analysis can be deep, yet not only extractive, but contributes to the generation of a shared analysis. Worth emphasizing that participatory techniques are not only "qualitative games", but there is a solid experience of "deriving solid numbers" with the involvement of local communities, something that CESVI could look more into. (see for example "who counts: the power of participatory statistics - https://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/who-counts-the-power-of-participatory-statistics).
- **Chose methodologies to better link analysis to change.** The KAP study remained quite academic. CESVI is now contemplating methodologies of action which – by design – link more strongly analysis and behaviour change (such as Systematic Behaviour Change – RANAS - http://www-eawag.emp-eaw.ch/458/?L=1. This would indeed a better investment for the organization.
- **Communicate better, make a case**. It emerged that research / analysis were not adequately communicated to stimulate engagement. UNRWA lamented that they are already "*swimming in information*", so data / evidence should not have been presented in cumbersome formats, but be processed down to something that is simple, practical and useful (e.g. factsheets, clear propositions). Something that can be used for making a case, for decision making (for example, pointing out the saving that could be achieved by changing delivery routes). UNRWA also recommended to clearly link data to issues of "*value for money*" (I would rather suggest a broader framework of "value for resources", emphasizing also non-monetary components).
- **Strengthen monitoring for coordination**. We also noticed that the sharing of information and evidence amongst CESVI and Overseas remained quite limited – and this reduced opportunities for integration of work. Monitoring should also become instrumental in creating stronger coordination amongst partners.

Handover monitoring

The best shift that could be done when setting monitoring is **to design it for the system** (i.e. solid waste management in Shu'fat) **rather than for the project** (CESVI / overseas project). In this way, the monitoring system will still be providing information about the system setup and progress which CESVI can report to donors. But monitoring will not then end at the end of the project: it can be co-managed and then handed over to the people who will be in charge.

Designing a monitoring system that can be handed over implies to think about its future users and their capacity and be realistic in doing so. Who should monitor what? Through what tools? And how is information supposed to be used? What should it trigger? The linkages of monitoring with accountability and sustainability in the long term are evident! As mentioned UNRWA is now seeking to design its monitoring system, so synergies could be sought (how could primary collection be best

monitored? how could the monitoring system of UNRWA best integrate with local solid waste management?)

The new information technologies offer exciting options to monitor solid waste management, which we discussed during the evaluation (e.g. data collection through mobile phones feeding into visualizations, use of street view technologies such as Mapillary, time-lapse of changes, use of the blockchain, use of blogs, social media…). A strong monitoring of the system will need to incorporate such options, which bring data and information closer to people.

Open data in a sensitive context

The solid waste management system is very opaque, hence the need to build a strong monitoring system, open and traceable. This is even more relevant as UNRWA is currently setting up its monitoring system - and CESVI staff is consulted as part of this. The project has therefore the potential to understand how to better monitor the juncture amongst primary collection / transfer – and to pilot how these data can be openly shared – as "open data". ("*Open data is data that can be freely used, re-used and redistributed by anyone - subject only, at most, to the requirement to attribute and sharealike*". - http://opendatahandbook.org/)

Open data – however, need to be accompanied by conflict sensitivity, as some of the information are actually very political and challenging to share. It is important, however, that sensitiveness to potential conflict does not become an excuse for lack of disclosure! CESVI needs to become apt at recognizing:

- **What information is sensitive yet must be disclosed**: for example, benefits to individual organizations, details of plans are sometimes kept confidential because "other people might complain about them". The alternative is to keep them secret… and then just have gossips about them, often even more damaging. Some decisions will not be popular, but the way forward is not to hide them. Is to put them in the open so that they can be dealt with.
- **What information need to be double checked, scrutinized before going in the open**. The surveys done by CESVI resulted in population estimates which do not match existing ones. Because of the highly political consequences of such numbers, sharing them might be challenging. The investment needed in checking the estimates so that they could be confidently shared overcome the benefits open data. In such cases, when potential political consequence and confidence in data collection are at odd, prudence in sharing is actually advisable.

Piloting

The project is ready to go, but there are still **many questions mark about how the system will perform and how people will respond**. When the evaluation happened, the strategy forward was a major roll out – with no piloting (fearing that piloting might actually be perceived as "favouring one neighbourhood over others and creating tensions). We noticed, however, that many assumptions still exist that are untested, from technical ones such as time for loading and transfer to behavioural factors (will people take care of the bins?).
It will be **indeed very important to pilot the awareness campaign and/or of the waste management system**. It is highly suggested to do so, as a way to identify challenges, streamline procedures and also expose neighbourhood committees in learning, by looking at it, how the system will be rolled out (good communication might minimize the risk that early receivers will be perceived as privileged).

Some local community members are actually **worried of a short implementation phase**, with too little time and opportunity to adapt the system: ""*CESVI eventually will have to ask to extend the project: there is not enough time to implement. Otherwise the project will happen under pressure. There will not be adequate time to follow up activities. They will just do them to tick "done". We can do the activities, but are we achieving the spirit? He feels that in a hurry, the spirit will be lost.* "

Overall the project gave **too much emphasis to "theoretical analysis and research", too little to the needed adaptation and tinkering that will be needed to set the system**. This is definitely an aspect to rebalance in other projects. And something to be wary about in this one: the time might be too short to do a proper testing. The next section will emphasize how an "adaptive management" approach might suit better this type of projects.

- **Ensure that the big investment in data and analysis pays off.** CESVI is keen to be an organization with solid information and data. It is however important that such data are always strongly linked to use and action. Data collection should emphasize options for participation. Sharing requires stronger communication.
- **Invest in monitoring for the system.** Vis-à-vis a strong investment in data analysis, there was surprisingly little investment in the setup of a monitoring system. CESVI now sees the importance of strengthening its monitoring, and it is keen to do so in innovative ways. Rather than fixing the "Project monitoring" it should seek to design a monitoring system to be handed over to Shu'fat / UNRWA, based on open data and new technologies, and with adaptation and accountability in mind.
- **Monitoring is communication.** The process of change has been very poorly captured, and this had contributed to participation fatigue, lack of trust in the process. Emphasizing the communication of evidence – rather than a closed monitoring system, can make a difference in participatory projects – as well as in projects intending to influence stakeholders through research and evidence sharing.
- **Less abstract research, more learning by doing**. The project overinvested in research and planning, using "project cycle" approaches where assessment and planning are massive phases, then followed by implementation. Adaptive management breaks this pattern, and calls for more interaction amongst research, piloting, action. This would be a better model than the one in use. The importance of Piloting should not be underestimated.

Communicate better… and for real change.

The importance of investing in communication, strategically.

A more strategic approach to communication – making it a cross cutting expertise - is needed: as emphasized so far – communication is key for participation, for accountability, for awareness raising. Yet communication tended to be haphazard and not clearly structured.

- **Think dissemination and sharing at the outset, when collecting data and generating analysis.** As discussed before, the investment in data gathering / analysis / research did not pay off. Research was little useable: it did not get to the point where options, possibilities were clearly spelled out. And information was not packaged for dissemination and use. UNRWA, for example, emphasized that the large amount of work that went into the KAP did not end in a research worth sharing. Communication needs to be addressed beforehand, knowing that "less is more". Communication needs to be smart, to ensure that evidence triggers action. That research is picked up by policy makers / advocates. That citizens are positively provoked by new, actionable insights.
- **Harness options brought by new technologies.** It is an exciting time for communication, as the availability of new technologies for information production and sharing is offering many possibilities. More efforts should go into using them, being aware of the investment in facilitation that they demand. The working groups used **WhatsApp**, which worked well for them. But when the working group activities decreased, the WhatsApp group was hijacked by actors with different interests. It is of course fine if a group continue to work after the project, the challenge is to avoid that conversations lose momentum and are hijacked as the project is still ongoing, **Email** was used at the inception, and then phased out. **Social media** were only occasionally used, through the page of the Popular Committee, but it was not clear with what strategy and outreach. During the evaluation we checked the potential of other communication options (e.g. use of time lapse, collection of data through open platforms such as Mapillary). We noticed that more active ways of presenting issues were more likely to spark discussion on tangible ideas than the usual methods. Experimenting on how to create a virtuous circle amongst awareness / data gathering / building ownership of emerging evidence might be a way forward for the project
- **Invest in internal communication.** Not only it is important to share information with external stakeholders. But the different programming experts in CESVI and Overseas needs to better share their knowledge. **Communication** / coordination gaps had emerged, which needs to be addressed. They range from sharing technical know-how (on solid waste management, on awareness raising) so that people can be on the same page when planning ahead, to mechanisms for coordination and mutual accountability.
- **Make communication tangible.** The communication options so far have been little tangible. Lack of handouts made things hazy. The UNRWA foreman showed us a simple printout showing equipment, saying: "*Even just a printed paper of what is coming can make a difference. It is a little*

symbolic achievement that can already increase motivation. It is tangible and can have an effect on the performance".

All staff – and also community members interviewed - feel that **awareness will be key for the success of the project**. Yet the **work on awareness it only starting now**. On one side, it is true that **some messages could only be shared once the solid waste management system was designed** (for example, messages about where and how to use the bins, what to expect from the new system). However, **some very practical awareness messages – of simple actions to be undertaken - could have been shared throughout the project**. For example: the message "put the bag in the bin" can only be shared now. But the message "do not drag your bag on the ground, it will break" would have been useful at an earlier stage. **An early awareness raising could have accompanied a deeper process of understanding behaviours and local dynamics**: checking what messages / behaviours are already appreciated, and which factors are at play when they are not picked up.

- **Can awareness building be outsourced?** The awareness work so far was minimal. The bulk of the work will be commissioned to a consultant, but – as in the case of participation – it should be questioned why such a core skill for an organization with a strong pedagogical mandate as Overseas (http://www.overseas-onlus.org/statuto) is to be outsourced. As in the case of participation, a major campaign might require external additional skills, but the bulk of the work on ongoing awareness and communication should be in the remit of the organization.
- **Move from generic awareness, to tangible behaviour change.** This point already started to emerge when discussing the KAP study. It is very important that CESVI moves away from a generic "awareness raising" to a commitment on "behaviour change". A good reference, pinpointing effectively challenges and options for work on behavioural change, is this "**practical guide on behaviour change"** which highlights a method of work well applicable to CESVI / Overseas work **(**https://www.clovekvtisni.cz/en/behaviour-change-toolkit-2017-752pub). Incidentally, it is suggested that the planned manual on awareness raising is skipped – unless it is really clear how and with whom this resource will be used and why it would be better than existing produces such as the one mentioned above. The project should consider reallocating this money for more effective forms of communication
- **Avoid patronizing, be appreciative.** The evaluation discussion showed a tendency to be patronizing in discussing what messages should be passed on. And also, that there is very little knowledge of the actual attitudes and behaviours. It is key to rapidly get to pilot stage with some core messages for awareness, defined with "appreciative" attitudes.
- **Actively seek champions and positive deviance.** Linked to the above, enhance the agency of people: look for local champions, identify positive deviance worth sharing.

Key learning and way forward

- **Thinking strategically about communication.** Given its stance (a desire to position itself as a reputable actor, building on knowledge and expertise) CESVI needs to strengthen its capacity to disseminate information and research for use and uptake. This requires more clarity in identifying the core messages and investment in better and more agile dissemination practices.
- **Communication for coordination.** The information flow across different actors must be strengthen. New technologies, better practices should ensure that the different stakeholders of the project (within and across organizations) improve their capacity to share information and decision making.
- **Rethink awareness raising.** Awareness raising is the activity more obviously connected with communication and was signaled as a crucial – yet missing – one by the people we interviewed. In future project, it should be designed to happen alongside the whole project, ensuring that it is part of the core skills by implementing organizations. In the current one, awareness raising will need to be quickly stepped up in the last phases of the project, and this could be an opportunity to rethink it: from a generic information campaign, to one that clearly link communication with behavior change. Little relevant actions – such as an awareness manual by Overseas – should be better skipped at this stage.


Adaptive management.

The project cycle is the main paradigm in use by organizations. According to it the project is split in subsequent phases: implementation follow planning, planning follows analysis. And M&E functions

are implemented towards the end. It is increasingly clear that a project cycle view does not adequately match processes of social change. And this project is a case in point. As a local stakeholder put it: *Every activity was stopped, just waiting for a strategy that was always "coming in 2/3 months". The project should have aimed at a strategy, but not to a point where all the project is spent on making a strategy… and seeing the output only at the end.* The people consulted in Shu'fat were not clear about the overall roadmap, despite a long-term engagement in the project.

- **Shift to incremental analysis.** Adaptive management is also about moving away from the belief that all needed analysis can be collected prior to proceed to planning. How much can be foreseen, through data collection? How much needs to be "discovered by doing"? The programme had oscillated in between "too much analysis" and "too little". On one side, had invested a lot of analysis before implementation. This analysis, however, proved inadequate for the needs of the project. The KAP, for example, was quite generic, and did not really identify local issues to explore. On the other side, analysis was lacking: receptivity of people to awareness, challenging behaviours were not identified early on. The project is learning that **analysis should be incremental and adaptive**: growing as action grows, and capable to identify, as the project goes along, what are the challenges worth exploring.
- **Increase the capacity to think risk and anticipate possibilities.** Adaptive management is stronger if staff and key stakeholders are more apt at identifying risk and possibilities. For example, if the programme anticipates them, a checklist for environmental educators / partners could be created. It would be then easier to identify symptoms of needed adaptation.
- **Strengthen participation through incremental action.** Incrementalism might have supported participation. For example, the project defined 3 "hotspots" (areas to upgrade: dumps, roofs). They have been realized late in the project with a top down approach. Tendering practices ended up being controlled by some of the CBOs. Overall the hotspot become an end in itself. A better way forward would have been to see the hotspot as an opportunity to step up involvement. Smaller projects, with less budget – but more open to ideas and participation might have been a better way forward. They might have shown "quick results" and stimulated participation / identify local activists beyond the CBOs. They would also have been an opportunity to test modalities of interventions and buy-in from people incrementally. This is something that also local actors picked on: "*Some activities should have gone in parallel: for example, the roof rehabilitation. At the beginning there was a plan, but it was all stopped".*
- **Rethink monitoring.** The previous chapter already highlighted the need for a more agile monitoring, and it is worth reinstating this here. Results indicators proved not to be every useful to understand change: they materialize too far down the line. The process is already shifting towards an appreciation of process indicators / intermediary results, which is definitely the way forward.

Incremental planning, along a clear roadmap (and with gains along the way)

- **A very strong vision of the expected changes**. Adaptive management rests on having a very strong vision of expected changes – not at the "output" but at the "outcome" level. What is the achievable dream that the project seeks to realize? It is important that the vision incorporates also social changes (i.e.: not only having a cleaner camp, but also envisioning groups of citizens working together for it, responsive committees that can take action). It is also important to contrast the anticipated view with the current state of things. Rather than saying a generic "community should be more aware", it would be important to appreciate: "what will people do that was not done before?"
- **Clarity on the main steps of the change process**. People should have clarity of the overall anticipated roadmap
- **Do not plan everything!** Not all activities will need to be planned at the start: good management rests in identify what actions needs to be unpacked, and to what extent. This modality of planning ensures to keep focus on the broad picture of change, and to zoom into the activity level as it is needed. It also ensures that the roadmap always comes first – rather than disconnected activities.

- **Anticipate critical paths.** Whilst keeping action and implementation flexible, it is important to anticipate critical paths. A critical path involves stringing together dependent actions: an activity on the critical path cannot be started until its predecessor activity is complete; if it is delayed for a day, the entire project will be delayed! Identifying such chains allows project managers to prioritize and allocate resources to get the most important tasks done and reschedule any lower priority jobs. Critical paths were not always identified in the project. One challenge was that in some cases the actions on the critical path were split amongst different actors, and it was harder to see the interconnections. A case in point is the planning of communication and awareness initiatives along the project piloting and roll out.
- **Learn along the way.** The secret of adaptive management is the capacity to learn along the way. During the evaluation it clearly emerged that staff feel the need to share practices within and across projects, to share and overcome the many challenges encountered. More spaces for this need to be found. A clear theory of change – coupled with a roadmap - can also help to revisit and anchor learning along the process: it allows people to avoid getting bogged down in day to day activities but always seeing the higher ground – and adapt accordingly.

Risk management

The programme had considered risk. For example, it built a system which can still work even if the primary collection through bins fails. Risk assessment, however, seems to have been an implicit process, rather than an overt one of identifying threats and avenues to counter them.

- **Use a risk matrix (likelihood of threats / impact if they materialize) as a standard project tool**. Whist there has been an appreciation of risk, tools to actually manage it are missing. A risk matrix, as a minimum should be a standard tool in the project dashboard.
- **Anticipate the need for a plan B.** Some actual risks (maintenance of the system, impact of a closed transfer station, impact on the system on the informal waste picker) have been somehow pinpointed as issues, but it is not clear what is the plan B for them. In the spirit of adaptive management, it is not recommended that a plan is thought in detail. But needed contingency (e.g. having funds, having stakeholders to mobilize, having needed staff time to tackle anticipated issues if they materialized, having already checked attitudes of external stakeholders…) must be in place.
- **Share responsibility for risk management.** Most risk will need to be absorbed / countered by the local actors. It is therefore very important that they are put in a position to appreciate and manage it. This range from the provision of maintenance tools (as requested by the UNRWA foreman) to the risk coming from changes in administrative setups (which would require a strong mutual accountability system). And, as discussed in the participation chapter, conflict sensitivities always need to be addressed.

Strengthen implementing partnerships

This project builds on the collaboration of two organizations (CESVI/Overseas). It was written as a consortium whereby organizations maintain a high degree of independence. But it would have demanded a much closer cooperation, as their areas of action are interdependent. For example:

- **Technical and awareness raising activities were not sufficiently linked**. Technical and awareness raising activities were run independently. There were little spaces to bring activities together, or to strategically plan, for example, how to best integrate activities. Staff turnover had further limited this. During the evaluation, we run a facilitated discussion to look at the awareness raising component, which showed issues and need for interactions not yet highlighted. Staff are now clearly becoming aware of this gap and it is hoped that collaboration will increase.
- **Harmonize management**. The administrative arrangement resulted in odd splits. For example, the four environmental educators were working in the same team and with similar engagements. But two were recruited by Overseas, two by CESVI, with different modalities for payment of their salaries, which created frustrations.
- **Limited coordination overall**: the two organizations share the same office, yet there is not a regular practice of meetings. They also lack shared tools (for example planning and monitoring tools such as shared timelines / GNATT charts). Improvement in planning and monitoring (as already discussed in the monitoring section) are needed to coordinate and complement effectively action of CESVI and overseas.

Both organizations had (or will) relied on external consultants for important activities. This was the case of CESVI delegating the participatory set up of the plan. Overseas called in consultants (with unsatisfactory results) for engagements with schools and will depend on an external consultant to design the awareness campaign. **The reliance on external consultants on core project activities need to be reconsidered: if organizations need to rely on external experts for activities that are at the core of the programme, what is then their role?** This was further aggravated by the fact that both organization seemed to have lacked the capacity to provide clear benchmarks and roadmaps for the processes subcontracted to external consultants. If substantial components of the programmes are contracted out, this should at least be done within a clear strategy – which was missing Participation, communication are not "add on components": they need to be strongly integrated within the programme. They are not "yet another activity", but they define "how" activities are made. Delegation to external consultancies had weakened rather than strengthened the programme.

Key learning and way forward

- **Ensure that CESVI and Overseas cooperate more closely in the final activities of the project.** Future activities (implementation of the solid waste management plan, awareness around it) require a close coordination amongst CESVI and Overseas. It is key that the two organizations get to collaborate and coordinate more closely.
- **Rethinking future modalities for cooperation.** A "consortium" might not guarantee a close interaction. If CESVI and Overseas intend to work together in similar projects, they should consider stronger "co-planning and co-strategizing" – looking in particular at how to harmonize the issues highlighted so far: participation, accountability, communication, adaptive management.
- **Rethink the role of external consultancies.** Reconsider the opportunity of contracting out substantial components of the programme: the risk is that external consultants get to drive the programme, reducing the role of implementing organizations to intermediaries.

Conclusions

This evaluation was built around the Theory of Change developed for CESVI in Palestine. It was an opportunity to deepen the work started with the evaluation of the Tulkarem project, last year. It helped to strengthen the theory developed then, to adapt it to the context of Shu'fat, to build awareness and ownership of it amongst project participants. Hence, the evaluation was a much richer process than what is captured in this report. It was also an opportunity to critically reflect, together: within the project, but also across the organizations and stakeholders working on it. And across projects: some support / exchanges with the new project in Tulkarem and in Hebron were also included in the consultancy. This was a great opportunity to make the Theory of Change and the findings more relevant across the board.

This report has highlighted:

- **Challenges, opportunities,** learning for each of the key activities identified by the theory of change. It is hoped that this work is just the start of a learning process, which will continue to deepen knowledge and experience around them.

- **Cross cutting themes and issues** that CESVI should strategically tackle to improve the management and implementation of its projects. It became evident that the full realization of the theory of change rests on strengthening such dimensions – and in defining, more clearly, strategies and practices towards them – in collaboration amongst the projects in Palestine and CESVI, overall. Such strategic, cross cutting themes are:

    o Participation
    o Accountability
    o Data gathering and analysis
    o Communication
    o Adaptive management
    o Partnership

  For each of them, specific recommendations have been highlighted.