



Building livelihood and community resilience

Lessons for policy and programming from Somalia and Zimbabwe

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January 2019

Key messages

- Resilience-building and livelihood approaches in fragile and volatile environments need adaptive management and flexible programming. Innovation, experimental learning, projects tailored to fit local contexts and a readiness to pilot new ideas and learn from failure can be key success factors.
- Programmes focusing on diversifying livelihoods should consider migration and transitions from rural to informal urban livelihoods as possible adaptive strategies for smallholder farmers. Resilience strategies should target both host communities and displaced people through access and employment opportunities, to prevent conflicts over resources.
- Targeting marginalised groups such as women and IDPs is crucial to reducing vulnerability and building resilience. Resilience policy-making, programming and funding instruments should embrace the 'leave no one behind' principle explicitly, prioritising actions to support the poorest and most marginalised with the aim of ending extreme poverty and reducing inequalities.
- A governance- and process-oriented approach focused on building and strengthening partnerships between a broad range of local public and private actors is essential to achieving goals in fragile settings at all levels (households, communities, systems). Programming should actively promote accountability and ownership, and ensure the involvement of all relevant stakeholders.
- A long-term vision and 'durable solutions' approach for the reintegration of displaced people and the sustainable management of an enabling environment is fundamental to fostering resilience. This requires integrated policies and strategies to address national and local development priorities that are climate-smart, environmentally friendly and gender-sensitive, and that address the drivers of displacement.



Cesvi is a lay independent organisation funded in Bergamo in 1985. Active in 20 countries, it operates worldwide to support the most vulnerable populations in promoting human rights and achieving their ambitions, for sustainable development.

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Acknowledgements

This policy paper is co-funded by DG DEVCO within the project Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (EU FED/2015/365-551). We would like to thank Lylen Albani and Valeria Emmi for their peer review, Mohamed Adan Ahmed, Patrizia Gattoni, Novella Maifredi, Loris Palentini and Piyarat Sajila Smith for their advice and information on Cesvi's projects, Mohamed Bare (Cesvi BRCiS Country Coordinator) and Perrine Piton (BRCiS Programme Manager) for their contributions to the research. This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ODI and of the European Union.



Co-funded by
the European Union



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1 Introduction

1.1 Community resilience

Resilience is recognised as central to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 2015–2030 and the Paris Climate Agreement. The term ‘resilience’ is widely used in policy, practice and academic discourse. It is applied in different contexts, including engineering, ecology, organisational and management studies, psychology, risk management and disaster reduction. It has been conceptualised in various ways, ranging from traditional ideas around resistance to shocks and the ability to maintain or bounce back to the status quo to more progressive ideas linked to adaptive management and the creation of new capacities to deal with unforeseen changes (de Bruijne et al., 2010; Manyena et al., 2011). In the fields of development, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and adaptation, resilience programming has been strongly influenced by systems thinking regarding the interactions between human societies and the environment (Walker and Salt, 2006).

There is an active debate about appropriate conceptual frameworks for resilience and how to apply resilience approaches. Operational agencies often bypass academic arguments about what resilience is. Instead, they concentrate on what it consists of by identifying key components or characteristics that can help in making informed decisions about where and how to intervene in different situations (e.g. Twigg, 2009). Others focus on the general features of resilient systems, trying to integrate resilience, disaster management and climate change adaptation at policy and programme levels (e.g. Bahadur et al., 2010). Overall, it is agreed that resilience approaches provide an opportunity to break down silos and barriers, enabling actors to look across sectors and scales. Resilience theory and programming also need to take social power

relationships into account, as the benefits of resilience may not be distributed equally within and between communities (Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010; Levine et al., 2012).

Many development agencies have adopted resilience approaches. These vary between agencies, but they often have key features in common. The Interagency Resilience Learning Group, comprising some 50 UK-based international NGOs, commissioned a report to identify key lessons in resilience programming, based on its members’ experiences (Bond, 2017). The report highlighted the importance of taking an integrated and holistic systems approach to resilience to understand the complex and interrelated factors that influence an individual’s ability to cope and adapt. It underlined the significance of understanding core and common processes in resilience programming across different organisations, as well as of applying resilience approaches to meet both humanitarian and development goals. It also pointed out the crucial importance of adaptive approaches to programming (based on evidence, learning and innovation), and addressing issues of equity and inclusion, acknowledging trade-offs and ensuring that actions to build resilience in one sector, community or social group do not have negative effects elsewhere.

Attempts have also been made to identify common features of resilience at the community level (Twigg, 2009; Arup International Development, 2012). A recent review identified nine core elements of community resilience: local knowledge, community networks and relationships, communication, health, governance and leadership, resources, economic investment, preparedness and mental outlook (Patel et al., 2017). Although many different metrics have been developed, there is no consensus on how to measure resilience in the field. It is generally agreed that resilience

is highly contextual, requiring multi-sectoral approaches adapted to local circumstances (Winderl, 2014; Levine, 2014).

Increasingly, resilience is being understood in terms of building different types of capacity within communities and social-ecological systems. Many agencies use the approach of the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme,¹ which identifies three types of capacity: adaptive, anticipatory and absorptive (often referred to as the ‘3As’). Adaptive capacity is the ability of social systems to adapt to multiple, long-term and future climate change risks, and to learn and adjust after a disaster. Anticipatory capacity is the ability of social systems to anticipate and reduce the impact of climate variability and extremes through preparedness and planning. Absorptive capacity is the ability of social systems to face and manage adverse conditions or emergencies. The 3As approach is widely used by operational agencies to plan and evaluate resilience programmes. Linked to this is transformation: the series of deliberate attempts to engineer the changes required to build capacities and achieve a desired goal – for example, to alter institutional policies or power relations – often involving innovative technologies and processes (Bahadur et al., 2015).

The European Union (EU) argues that resilience can play a major part in its 2017 ‘New European Consensus on Development’ vision and action framework, which puts emphasis on fragile and conflict-affected countries. Specifically, resilience can help build the capacity of states and societies to deal with increased risk, recover their core functions quickly after a shock and deliver long-term solutions. The EU aims at a dynamic, multi-dimensional approach to resilience at all levels to address the risk ‘nexus’ – that is, vulnerability to multiple interrelated risks including environmental and economic shocks, disasters, conflicts and global threats to

health – and enhance the resilience of the most vulnerable people, particularly in countries facing protracted or recurrent crises. This requires operationalising the humanitarian–development nexus by strengthening the links between relief, rehabilitation and development (European Commission, 2017a).²

Similarly, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)’s Southern Africa Resilience Strategy 2018–21 argues for efforts to address food crises along the humanitarian–development–peace nexus, in order to break the cycle of crisis and deepening vulnerability. This involves a twin-track approach to meet immediate humanitarian needs while addressing the root causes of hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity by investing in resilient agricultural livelihoods (FAO, 2018). The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)’s 2016 strategy for engagement in fragile countries includes among its guiding principles risk management, resilience, a focus on root causes and strategic and complementary partnerships (IFAD, 2016). The World Food Programme (WFP)’s 2016–20 Zimbabwe strategy (‘Building resilience for zero hunger’) also addresses long-term recovery and resilience-building to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and undernutrition, while maintaining humanitarian assistance capacity (WFP, 2016).

Aid and development agencies face significant challenges in building resilience in unstable and violent contexts, especially in protracted crises (Levine and Mosel, 2014). Conflict reduction and DRR initiatives are usually carried out separately, and there has been little progress in adopting more integrated approaches (Peters, 2017). A 2016 report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) observed that: ‘in reality, policy makers and practitioners know relatively little about how to reduce fragility and increase resilience’

1 BRACED is a 15-agency consortium implemented in a number of countries in South and Southeast Asia, East Africa and the Sahel (www.braced.org).

2 Joint Humanitarian and Development Frameworks (JHDFs) have been developed as a basis for humanitarian and development planning and programming in a number of countries. DG DEVCO and DG ECHO have been leading this process. An important parallel initiative is the 2017 European Investment Plan, a framework for improving investment in Africa through a combination of grants, loans and innovative financial products. It involves the EU, international financial institutions, civil society and the private sector (European Commission, 2017b).

(OECD, 2016: 13). Although some aspects of resilience in fragile and insecure contexts have been researched – for example, issues linked to climate resilience or informal coping mechanisms (Verner and Heinemann, 2006; Carpenter, 2008; Vivekananda et al., 2014) – there is a need to better understand the relationships between insecurity and fragility and resilience, based on empirical evidence from programmes. Private sector organisations can play an important role in such contexts by creating jobs and economic opportunities, and as programme partners, implementers and intermediaries in contexts where state institutions lack the authority or capacity to play this role effectively (European Commission, 2014).

Cesvi is developing a theoretical conceptualisation of resilience and operational guidance on resilience-building in fragile environments. Cesvi’s projects in Somalia and Zimbabwe, described and analysed in this report, are a step towards improving such understanding.

1.2 Livelihood approaches in fragile contexts

The links between resilience and livelihoods are clear: a successful livelihood strategy must incorporate mechanisms for coping and bouncing back when difficulties emerge. Livelihood approaches can generally be defined as programmatic interventions that enhance people’s income-generating capacities by increasing their assets through the provision of cash transfers, infrastructure, support services, market expansion activities and training.

Social protection mechanisms such as cash transfers and cash-for-work can support livelihood recovery in fragile and conflict-affected situations. In their review of case studies from Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Niger and Indonesia, Carpenter et al. (2012) showed that cash transfers can be used to facilitate coping in crises, and may subsequently be spent on recovery activities such as rebuilding houses, investing in productive assets and school fees. In Uganda, evidence suggests that cash transfers offer high economic returns, especially when coupled with training programmes (Blattman et al., 2014). The

‘Grand Bargain’ agreed at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit emphasises that cash transfers can help empower conflict-affected people and bolster local markets.

Cash-for-work components may also be used to (re)construct the necessary infrastructure for people to pursue agricultural livelihood strategies. Indeed, infrastructure in fragile environments has increasingly emerged as a priority among donors, to promote access to markets and establish the preconditions for long-term economic growth (Ali et al., 2015). One impact assessment from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) suggests that improved roads helped to increase freedom of movement through better security, reduce transport costs and increase farm-gate prices (Levine and Chastre, 2004). However, the longer-term effects of cash transfers are not clear: bypassing the state and its social protection function is not a sustainable policy as it ultimately undermines state legitimacy (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2014).

Market expansion activities in fragile and conflict-affected countries have also helped create new livelihood strategies for livestock owners and farmers. Diversification has always been an important part of such activities, expanding economic opportunities, spreading risk and building social networks (Stites and Bushby, 2017). Another key component, value chain development, yields insights into broader market structures: understanding what these structures are, and how households interact with them, is key to understanding how to better support local livelihoods. Potential approaches include cooperation with the private sector through enterprise-based training or bottom-up approaches to value chain development (Hoffman, 2015).

Agricultural extension practices and other technical and business training are often considered necessary complementing components in livelihood interventions. A 2014 literature review commissioned by ODI finds that, when designed with attention to the local context and power dynamics, training and vocational skills programmes in conflict environments can significantly improve livelihood opportunities. They may even

generate additional benefits, such as increased self-esteem, reduced violence and improved gender relations (Pompa, 2014). In addition, the World Bank recommends that technical assistance for institutional capacity-building should be a priority in conflict-affected states (World Bank Global Program on Forced Displacement, 2014). Attention needs to be paid to connecting rehabilitation and development through livelihood interventions which can be enhanced through building up the capacities of, and relations between, key local actors and state institutions (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2014).

In integrating these different components, most of the literature suggests a sequential approach to promoting income-generating activities and private sector development in fragile and conflict-affected situations, with a focus on emergency job creation initially, to be replaced over time by a growing focus on interventions aimed at longer-term income generation (Mallet and Slater, 2012). The literature also agrees on the importance of flexible programming. Fragile environments are economically and politically volatile, and livelihood approaches should be flexible in order to adapt to changing markets and local needs. The two case studies that follow give examples of such flexibility in programming.

1.3 Motivation and methodology

Cesvi is aware that resilience is a crucial issue in much of its programming, especially in fragile and conflict-affected areas. This policy paper is a product of Cesvi's need and wish to further its understanding of the subject by analysing its approach to livelihood and community

resilience in complex contexts, based on experience in Somalia and Zimbabwe.

This paper focuses on four key elements of transformative change in resilience-building suggested by an initial review of the documentation:

1. Resilience pathways and outcomes (community and livelihood resilience).
2. 'Enabling environments': internal and external factors enabling or obstructing progress.
3. Actors and stakeholders, and their roles in resilience-building.
4. Beneficiaries, equity and inclusion.

The findings will enable Cesvi to operationalise its approach more effectively and promote more successful resilience-building policies and interventions. Key external targets for the briefing are Cesvi's main stakeholders, including the UN Rome-based agencies (FAO, IFAD, WFP), the EU, EU Delegations in Southern countries, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and international NGOs.

This policy paper has been produced by an ODI research team comprising John Twigg (Principal Research Fellow) and Margherita Calderone (Research Fellow), and is a peer-reviewed publication by ODI and Cesvi. The approach consisted of an extensive document review (nearly 50 project and other documents supplied by Cesvi relating to its work in Somalia and Zimbabwe), supplemented by semi-structured interviews with four Cesvi key informants.

The following sections of the paper focus on the two case studies of Somalia and Zimbabwe, before concluding with recommendations for programming and policy.

2 Somalia case study



Woman walking in the area of Hargeisa, Somalia severely hit by drought. © Fulvio Zubiani, 2010.

2.1 Context

Somalia is a fragile state characterised by widespread clan conflict, recurrent drought and a protracted war between the Islamist Al-Shabaab militia and the Federal Government of Somalia, assisted by the African Union Mission in Somalia. Since the collapse of the national state and the outbreak of civil war in 1991, there has been little central government control over the entirety of the country's territory. Somalia has de facto been divided into at least three (semi-autonomous) territories: Somaliland in the north-west, Puntland in the north-east and the central and southern regions, which include the capital Mogadishu. While conflict has affected the whole country at one point or another, the violence has been concentrated in the central-southern regions, where Al-Shabaab has been most active.

Somalia's economy is dominated by livestock-rearing and exports, remittance inflows and money transfers and telecommunications. The livestock sector contributes approximately 40% of gross domestic product (GDP) and accounts for almost 90% of total agricultural GDP and over half of exports. Many urban dwellers earn their income as livestock traders and brokers, or work in related activities. Pastoral livelihoods prevail in northern and central Somalia, with agro-pastoral livelihoods predominant in the south. Alongside clan-based support, migration and the sale of productive assets, destocking herds is the dominant coping strategy during droughts, but is frequently of limited effectiveness and pushes herders into poverty (Carter et al., 2007). Widespread poverty and a lack of employment create a fruitful environment for extremist

groups to recruit fighters by offering cash and other benefits (Majid and McDowell, 2012).

Development indicators have consistently been among the lowest in the world, despite long-standing and substantial international assistance. In 2011–12, Somalia experienced severe food insecurity and famine. At the peak of the crisis, 4 million people were in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, and an estimated 258,000 died between October 2010 and April 2012 (Checchi and Robinson, 2013). Another prolonged period of drought since 2016 has seen high levels of livestock deaths and large-scale crop failures in the worst-affected areas. Malnutrition and drought-related diseases are on the rise, as are population displacements. Growing competition for natural resources is increasing local tensions and could trigger further conflict. Over 6 million people (half the population) were estimated to be potentially in need of humanitarian assistance in early 2017 (OCHA, 2017).

The Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) Consortium was established in 2013. Led by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), it comprises Cesvi and other international NGOs.³ BRCiS started with a four-year grant from DFID, followed a year later by a grant from the EU's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO). It was subsequently extended until 2019 with further support from the EU and DFID to respond to the drought crisis through an Internal Risk Facility (IRF). A BRCiS 2.0 Consortium is now being designed.

2.2 Resilience pathways and outcomes

Overall, the desired outcome of the BRCiS programme is that target groups are better able to resist and recover from the cyclical shocks and stresses of conflict and environmental and economic crises. Improvements in resilience are measured

against four key indicators: the Dietary Diversity Score, the Food Consumption Score, the Household Asset Score and the Coping Strategy Index, developed by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit Somalia (FSNAU).

At the start, BRCiS was grounded on a classical understanding of resilience-building. Targeted households were involved in community-based DRR and response activities, alongside components focused on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions, as well as shelter and communal infrastructure support and measures to improve livelihoods. The programme targeted 30,100 households (210,700 individuals) in more than 100 communities in south and central Somalia.

The approach has evolved, and today BRCiS uses a flexible, integrated approach focused on building community resilience in sectors identified by communities themselves. This community graduation model builds on local people's own capacities to enable them to follow livelihoods strategies that can adapt to climate change and other shocks, respect the environment and ultimately lead to a healthy life free of poverty. Resilience is enhanced by improving the anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive capacities of households and communities to moderate the impact of shocks and adjust responses to changing internal and/or external drivers. This helps to build transformative capacities for systemic change.

The overarching theory of change assumes that, if vulnerable communities have the capacity to withstand shocks through improved economic opportunities, social safety nets and strengthened human capital, and are well-connected within ecosystems that help to mitigate the impacts of future shocks through the effective management of shared natural resources, strong local governance and social cohesion, then they are more resilient to recurrent shocks, engage in sustainable livelihood strategies and can contribute to long-term national development goals.

Based on this theoretical framework, BRCiS is focused around three main components:

3 Specifically, Concern Worldwide, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Save the Children International (SCI).

1. Building resilience.
2. Supplying humanitarian assistance.
3. Improving livelihoods and increasing local and national stakeholders' learning, capacity and knowledge around resilience.

BRCiS has evolved from a humanitarian-first approach into a carefully designed programme for building community resilience. For instance, education was not included in the first proposal as there were more pressing and urgent needs, but subsequent proposals (DEVCO I and II and DFID 2) added components to build technical and business skills. The programme has also required adaptive programming to deliver interventions that are responsive to changes in context, evolving needs and learning. Another consortium funded by DFID over the same initial period (Strengthening Nutrition in Somalia: SNS, 2013–17) worked on reducing acute malnutrition. BRCiS and SNS were merged into one consortium under the BRCiS brand.

Each of the three main components evolved in a similar way, from humanitarian-first to a graduated approach to community resilience. Under the first programme component, aimed at increasing resilience capacities, the consortium helped to develop


Community-Based Disaster Management Plans (CBDMPs) and Community-Based Early Warning Systems (CBEWS), drawing on local mapping of hazards and vulnerabilities and local mitigation and adaptation capacities. The idea was to reinforce early warning systems by supplementing traditional knowledge with technology, and to update them into 'early action' systems by developing a tracking system for disasters. This would enable the activation of appropriate responses and timely requests for emergency funds. During the subsequent implementation of the two DEVCO projects, activities included community mobilisation (the formation of village councils, participatory consultation, the preparation of community action plans and oversight of their development and the formation of community committees) and training in DRR and natural resource management. BRCiS 2.0 will have a nutrition-sensitive lens, adding community-based interventions with both promotive and curative aspects. To contribute to reductions in malnutrition rates, investments will support primary education.

Under the component aimed at delivering humanitarian assistance, the consortium worked on the construction and rehabilitation of key



Everyday life in Galkayo, Somalia. © Fulvio Zubiani, 2010.

Figure 1 BRCiS theory of change



physical infrastructure to strengthen livelihoods and community cohesion (such as early warning and early action discussions). Activities included construction of transitional shelters, latrines and sanitation and waste management systems, as well as the rehabilitation of damaged shelters and water points, feeder roads, rangelands and community forests.⁴ These activities were subsequently

complemented by hygiene awareness and education campaigns, training in soil conservation and the construction of community halls. Attention was paid to the needs of vulnerable groups (i.e. women and children), who benefited directly from targeted actions including hygiene and nutrition training, and indirectly through the improvement of WASH structures, such as gender-sensitive latrines.

⁴ Other activities aimed at strengthening infrastructure included stabilising river banks and dunes, the demarcation of livestock migration routes, surface water harvesting and storage schemes and similar interventions to improve access to safe and sufficient water.

Under the third component, aimed at restoring and strengthening livelihoods, the consortium implemented interventions identified by communities themselves, ranging from relief assistance to longer-term support to improve household food security and resilience. One element included cash transfers and returnee support packages;⁵ another supported community resilience by developing asset bases and improving returns on those assets through urban and rural livelihood activities (e.g. micro-enterprise development and farmer and pastoralist field schools and livestock interventions). The consortium offered training on technical agronomy skills, vocational skills, business development and financial literacy. It also implemented animal health treatment campaigns and supplied animal health equipment and drugs. In the second phase, these activities were supplemented by the establishment of village savings and loan associations, and training in their operation; hiring, training and equipping community animal health workers; support for women in poultry farming; and a new component to strengthen the milk value chain.

Attention was given to ensuring integration and synergies between the different components. For instance, technical and financial support was provided to keep existing but overused water points in operation, and hence protect milking animals. Cash-for-work schemes were used to build and rehabilitate water infrastructure among marginalised and vulnerable beneficiaries. Emergency activities in the form of water provision and unconditional cash transfers were provided as safety nets for displaced communities,⁶ and long-term resilience-building activities in areas of origin acted as a pull factor to encourage return. These activities were carefully layered and sequenced – e.g. activities to increase the availability of milk in the household were layered with activities to enable women to extract the maximum value out of the milk value chain.

Another example relates to the development of the livelihood component, which consisted

of activities initially implemented independently and then sequenced. In the first year of BRCiS, tree-planting to reverse deforestation, farmer field schools to build agronomy skills and cash transfers during the lean season, to alleviate income gaps, were implemented in parallel. After a monitoring and learning exercise, tree-planting was added by contracted field school members to grow seedlings and plant trees, and finally pay-by-results cash payments for contracted members were introduced. The trees were maintained by local field school contractors, and tree survival rates significantly increased.


Not all the activities worked out as planned. For instance, the idea of updating Early Warning Systems (EWS) into ‘early action’ systems by developing a tracking system for disasters, to allow for timely requests for emergency funds, was difficult to implement. EWS was not reliable enough to form the basis of internal and external advocacy to allow for (re-)allocation of funding, and funding was not predictable and mostly was not available throughout the year. This underlined the need for capacity within the programme to predict and assess shocks, with indicators, thresholds, triggers and contingency plans of consistent quality.

In BRCiS 2.0, the consortium plans to invest more in capacity-building to ensure that staff skills are suited to DRR and resilience programming, and aims at restructuring its monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) system to include a proper assessment of the frequency, volatility and impact of shocks and stressors on local communities. This would require data to be collected at non-regular points, triggered by early warning signs, which in turn means establishing EWS and response methodologies agreed through intensive technical processes. Climatic triggers could be used in rural areas, and IDSUE (Indicator Development for the Surveillance of Urban Emergencies, developed by Concern Worldwide) triggers in urban areas. Strengthening the consortium’s EWS

5 This comprised the provision of cash grants, cash-for-work schemes, conditional and unconditional cash transfers, credit injections to remote rural areas and return packages, as well as the formation of savings and loan funds.

6 Programme staff reported that some households moved into BRCiS areas in order to be eligible for the cash transfer.

Figure 2 BRCiS programme in Somalia since 2013



would also help encourage emergency funding through the Internal Risk Facility, and the efficient allocation of that funding.

2.3 Beneficiaries, equity and inclusion

The main goal of BRCiS is to assist people either currently in, or at risk of falling into, a humanitarian emergency. Beneficiaries are selected from four main vulnerable groups historically prone to humanitarian disaster: pastoralists and destitute pastoralists, riverine agro-pastoralists, the urban poor (including Internally Displaced People – IDPs) and returnees. Targeted communities are selected based on seven criteria weighted in order of importance.⁷ Within targeted communities, BRCiS focuses on: women and women-headed households; youth and young families; people with disabilities; and marginalised groups

(minority clans and occupational clans in urban and rural areas). Men and women actively participate in the programme’s implementation through a gender-sensitive approach, where groups are consulted through targeted single-sex and age-based Focus Group Discussions.

The BRCiS Consortium acknowledges the huge challenges involved in trying to transform gender norms in Somali culture, while not conceding to them: for example, women were included in beneficiary selection and verification despite strong opposition from traditional structures. The programme also acknowledged the potential negative consequences of increasing women’s engagement in economic activities as family responsibilities tended to fall on a female relative or the oldest daughter, whether or not there was a male available at home. Nonetheless, through careful analysis the programme tried to encourage women’s empowerment as much as possible. For example, gender analysis in

⁷ The criteria are accessibility, recurrence in the Integrated Food-Security Phase Classification 3 and 4 over the previous three years, access to basic services, presence of IDPs and minority groups, community acceptance of the programme, potential area of return for refugees and IDPs, and presence of other humanitarian actors in the area.

the programme locations showed that women were often prohibited from owning, renting or inheriting land in their name, while it was easier for women to acquire livestock, particularly small animals. Small stock can also be easily divided and managed, and can be quickly converted into cash when needed. Accordingly, female-headed households were prioritised for support under the poultry farming intervention. Similarly, attention was paid to ensuring that activities targeting IDPs were suited to their situation (e.g. having no access to land or limited access to services) and, hence, IDP interventions focused on capacity-building and training to help them reintegrate into their local economies.

More generally, community analyses completed through Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs) informed subsequent plans. The consortium recognised that informal and formal leadership structures play a crucial role in efficiently targeting communities and beneficiaries, increasing programme ownership and informing programming. As part of its accountability strategy, the consortium also created community feedback tools (e.g. a hotline for complaints, suggestion boxes in health facilities) to ensure that comments and suggestions from beneficiaries could be gathered and addressed.

2.4 Actors and stakeholders – systems and partnerships

The BRCiS approach, based on PRA tools for the participatory identification of risks, vulnerabilities and capacities, has helped partners discuss priorities with communities. However, BRCiS members found that their investment was less efficient where participant communities were scattered across a district. Conflict between participants and non-participant communities created tensions and insecurity. In contrast, some of the programme's major achievements came when links were increased between its communities and stakeholders in the wider ecosystem. This included activities such as linking marginalised groups to larger clans through markets and businesses, investing in local veterinary institutions to deliver animal health services and improving fodder production

in riverine areas, to provide feed for herds in neighbouring regions.

The systems approach was also applied to the analysis of rural–urban links within the activities of the consortium. BRCiS data highlighted the importance of migration and urbanisation in the arid and semi-arid lands of East Africa. This suggests that programmes with a focus on diversifying livelihoods strategies need to take into account migration and urbanisation as possible adaptive strategies. For this reason, the BRCiS programme included activities to prepare youth to migrate through skills training, urban-based reception interventions for new migrants and a value chain approach to milk production and marketing that linked peri-urban and urban areas.

The systems approach can be extended to considerations around the humanitarian–development nexus. Indeed, a key assumption of BRCiS is that, by working together across sectors, scales (i.e. individual, household, community and system) and funding modalities (humanitarian and development), the synergies created by the consortium will result in a more resilient population. Initially, though, one of the barriers to successful programming was the lack of understanding of resilience and the ability of staff to implement resilience activities that required different knowledge and capacities than emergency aid. For BRCiS 2.0, the consortium found a way forward: when the initial assessment identifies a relevant pathway to change, but this requires competencies that are not part of the consortium portfolio, then it will seek an external solution – perhaps through the establishment of a new partnership. For instance, the consortium aims to bridge the gap with the private sector by adding a private sector development specialist to the network, in recognition of the vibrancy of the private sector in Somalia, with major economic activity in the services sector. This specialist will likely be focused on mid-value chain development and export market creation.

More generally, the consortium improved its programming by building on the different competitive advantages of its members and ensuring that the range of available skills within the group was shared through coordination mechanisms, dissemination of lessons, weekly collaboration meetings for field staff and

technical groups with representatives from all of the member NGOs.

In its 2.0 version, the consortium also aims to support transformative capacities and expand its systems approach to a wider level (i.e. area-based) to track and understand spill-over effects, link beneficiary communities with others and with the national level and learn from and leverage what other programmes are doing in Somalia, in the resilience sector and beyond (including DRR and stabilisation).

2.5 Enabling environment and barriers

The BRCiS Consortium has faced a series of significant challenges, from drought and floods to weather-related shocks, and from recurrent insecurity to pressures from district authorities wanting to interfere with day-to-day operations and persistent political instability, which often meant that participatory planning activities had to start again from scratch each time a main leader changed.

A high degree of donor flexibility allowed for the necessary adaptation and provided the support needed to reach most of the BRCiS objectives. With the understanding of DFID and the EU, the consortium took an adaptive approach to programming grounded in evidence, learning and innovation. The initial MEL strategy was based on periodic large-scale evaluations, frequent ‘light’ and targeted evaluations around key indicators, annual reviews of community plans and continuous programme monitoring. However, periodic large-scale evaluations were not implemented as planned. Questions were removed at the last minute from the questionnaires due to concerns about the length of the surveys, and over half of the records were not collected. Inconsistencies in data collection, trimming and sample selection made an overall quantitative estimate of the programme’s impact difficult, to the point where there was insufficient valid information to draw conclusive insights from the evaluation. Issues identified included the lack of training tools for interviewers, engagement to triangulate and quality-check data and oversight during the field data collection. Such data limitations underline

the need to use third parties for data collection and quality assurance.

Going forward, the BRCiS Consortium aims to strengthen its MEL activity, for example by using digital information management systems, diversifying its logframe indicators and shifting to a resilience roadmap. To start moving in this direction, the consortium has hired an MEL specialist and hosted a number of workshops presenting best practice in measuring resilience. For instance, in February 2015 the consortium co-hosted a meeting in Nairobi (co-organised by the Somalia Resilience Programme (SOMRep) and others), with technical experts and key decision-makers to explore ways to strengthen the resilience of the well-being systems of pastoral, agro-pastoral and peri-urban communities in Somalia over the next three to five years.

Since the election of the new government in 2017, interest from development actors in Somalia is becoming more concrete, and there is growing recognition of the importance of resilience-building. The Drought Impact Needs Assessment (DINA) report (a tripartite initiative of the EU, the World Bank and the UN, launched in January 2018) and the upcoming Resilience and Recovery Framework (RRF) are meant to open the way to more development funding aimed at resilience-building by acknowledging that the country will need significant external funding before it is able to reach self-reliance.

In this context, the BRCiS Consortium is collaborating with stakeholders at the national level in various ways – for example, by offering a triangulation point for the FSNAU data and analysis and by directly referring to the National Development Plan (NDP) in its 2.0 version. Presented in 2017, the NDP provides a framework for humanitarian and development actors as it sets out the country’s priorities for national recovery and development up to 2019. Priorities are identified in five areas: economic development, institutions, social and human development, infrastructure and resilience. The latter section emphasises the need for a ‘durable solutions’ approach to the socio-economic integration of displaced people, returning refugees or migrants, as well as to the

sustainable management of the environment. Another idea is to cooperate at the national level under BRCiS 2.0, including providing quarterly updates to all relevant parties, such

as the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, through a systematised reporting process from focal points to federal government representatives.

3 Zimbabwe case study



3.1 Context

For decades, Zimbabwe has experienced declining food production and has become a net food importer. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood for 70% of the population, and could provide significant returns from exports, but limited availability of capital and equipment, lack of foreign investment, donor dependence, negative impacts of land redistribution and fiscal instability have all limited growth. Extensive poverty and food insecurity, high levels of HIV/AIDS and persistent economic challenges have created vulnerable conditions that have been made worse by a series of droughts in recent years. The severe El Niño-induced drought in 2016–17 necessitated a \$360 million humanitarian intervention. In 2015, Zimbabwe ranked 155 out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index,

with 5 million people undernourished, and was 108th out of the 119 countries analysed in the 2017 Global Hunger Index.

Rural populations are increasingly dependent on natural resources to meet basic nutritional needs. This is particularly the case in some Trans-Frontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) of agro-ecological Zone V, where annual rainfall is generally too low to support rain-fed cultivation and farm households are seldom food-secure. The result is a growing and unsustainable reliance on natural resources, food aid and remittances, and an increasingly tense relationship between livestock production, wildlife ranching and conservation.

The agricultural sector could be improved and become more sustainable through properly planned, community-managed irrigation schemes, but many are defunct or operating at reduced capacity. Water sources and infrastructure are

often in a state of disrepair, while local irrigation management committees are dysfunctional. This situation is the result of a lack of community jurisdiction over their own resources, weak economic planning and entrepreneurial skills at local level and protracted dependence on subsidies and external support.

This background formed the context to a five-year programme (2011–16), funded principally by the EU and implemented by Cesvi in conjunction with local partners.⁸ The programme aimed to improve livelihoods⁹ in four TFCAs of the Lowveld and Zambezi regions in Zone V by intensifying and diversifying land use and promoting sustainable natural resource management. The Cesvi component of the programme primarily aimed at the transformation of the local economy, from subsistence agriculture to commercial farming. The programme sought to build natural and human capital, and to demonstrate the potential for improved food security and livelihood resilience through the sustainable, integrated and diversified management of smallholder farming and wildlife. It also sought to establish business-like partnership models within the TFCAs and provide access to local and national markets for the processing and sale of products, in collaboration with the private sector.

The programme had four components, of which the Shashe citrus initiative (the focus of this case study) was the main new project. The other components addressed wildlife conservation and animal health, and essentially provided support to their organisations' ongoing programmes. In addition to playing an overall leadership role, Cesvi was responsible for implementing the Shashe initiative, which was designed to foster sustainable and high-value crop (citrus) production by setting up an improved irrigation system for the Shashe farming community in the Maramani Communal Area (4,000 people in 20 villages in Beitbridge District in Zone V). The initiative supported the cultivation of 22,000 orange

trees on over 90 hectares of communal land. It also set up an innovative Private–Public Community Partnership (PPCP) for the marketing and management of produce, with links to commercial fruit juice producers and national markets. There was a commercial citrus industry in the district, but previous attempts at small-scale citrus cultivation in Shashe had been unsuccessful.

3.2 Resilience pathways and outcomes

The Shashe initiative constituted a significant shift away from traditional agricultural interventions to a more innovative system based on new technologies, market links and community ownership. Small, incremental, single-sector interventions would not meet local development and food security needs. Innovative, integrated and diversified land use and production systems were needed to transform the local economy, enabling communities to self-organise and build adaptive capacity and institutions. Hence, the project had technological, financial, community and partnership dimensions: its initial focus was on technical support; institutional and partnership elements became more significant over time.

The project was innovative technologically. It introduced a new commercial crop (citrus) into local community-managed agriculture, and breathed new life into an older irrigation scheme which had deteriorated over the previous 30 years, principally due to a lack of technical and financial capacity within the community following the end of central government support after independence. It replaced old irrigation technologies and a collapsed irrigation system with modern, more sophisticated, water-efficient irrigation technology (submersible pumps in the Shashe river; overhead irrigation from three centre pivots, giving a 50% saving of water over more traditional methods). Intercropping between the young orange trees, adopted at the

8 Lowveld Rhino Trust (LRT), the Tashinga Initiative (TTI) and the Wildlife Veterinary Unit (WVU) of the Department of Veterinary Services (later replaced by the Victoria Falls Wildlife Trust).

9 Although presented to donors as a livelihoods initiative, it was conceived by Cesvi staff as a resilience programme.

request of the community, provided vegetables (seed beans, squash, sweet potatoes, turnips, cabbage, maize) for consumption and sale.

Contract farming, introduced later in the project, represented financial innovation. Farmers could borrow inputs such as seeds and fertilizers as part of their contract with agribusiness companies involved in the project, and repay their loans from the subsequent yield. This reduced up-front capital investment and guaranteed crop sales, allowing even the poorest households to obtain fertilizer and farm high-value crops (i.e. seed multiplication instead of food).

The collaborative development of the project with the community and partners represented a different approach to sustainability based on economic autonomy and devolved authority to the local level. These partnerships were intended to increase resilience through links with the wider national and regional economy, while local management and responsibility ensured that the project remained responsive to community needs.

A new model of community-based commercial enterprise was set up by linking traditional knowledge of the area and its resources with local expertise from commercial ventures and fruit processing facilities. The project was designed to be self-sustaining through the PPCP, which came out of several years of discussion and consultation between communities and commercial stakeholders about how to produce and market high-value, locally-grown crops. The PPCP represented a new approach to the management of communal land irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe. It should function as an independent and commercially viable venture for 45–55 years (the lifespan of the citrus trees), by which time local farmers should have acquired sufficient economic resources and technical expertise to procure new trees for another cycle of citrus production.

The project required adaptive management allowing for experiential learning and decision-making. For instance, the introduction of intercropping enabled experimentation with different crop varieties. Partners were willing to amend plans and targets where necessary. The project also required a long-term vision, since commercially viable orange production was not

expected to begin until five years after planting. Major improvements to livelihoods would not become evident until orange production was firmly established (5–13 years after planting), although productive returns can continue for many more years. The initiative also aimed to support the development of the Maramani area as a tourist destination and centre for other economic activities.

It was recognised that the shift from subsistence agriculture to a commercial enterprise would require substantial local institutional development and the acquisition of new skills and competencies, which might take several years to develop. A demonstration plot, an experimental/trial plot (supported by the Beitbridge Juicing Company) and a resource centre were essential in supporting the work and the ongoing learning required for effective adaptation. Establishing demonstration plots helped to overcome initial scepticism about the project from some community members, while the centre became the focal point for ongoing learning. The resource centre was the hub of project activities, including training days, focus group discussions and workshops, meetings and weighing and storing crops for sale and despatch. Technical training was given in a range of subjects (including pest management, post-harvest crop management, business administration and marketing, operation of machinery and irrigation systems), aiming to establish technical capacity to sustainably produce and market crops after the end of the project. By 2030, the Shashe citrus orchard is expected to be producing over 6,000 tons of oranges for sale on the national market to juice and concentrate producers, with greatly improved food security and income for households. Ultimately, an expansion from 90ha to 500ha is envisaged, through private investors and donor agencies, to benefit the entire district.

It was also acknowledged that future sustainability could not be guaranteed, and some key risks were recognised. These included: agricultural risks relating to drought, climate change and crop diseases; ensuring the project's financial stability until citrus production became commercially viable; continuing to build the local management trust's capacity until it no longer needs external support; and the high cost and



low reliability of electricity supplies pending installation of solar power. Future progress will depend on the Maramani community's ability to maintain the irrigation system, cover utility costs and manage funds to replace expensive technical equipment when necessary.

Pilot contracts between the Cesvi-supported irrigation schemes (at Shashe and River Ranch) and private sector actors (Schweppes for citrus, SeedCo for sugar beans seeds and EastWestSeeds for butternut seeds) quickly generated significant income. Contracts signed between SeedCo and seven communities for the production of sugar beans seeds are expected to generate a net income of \$190,000 in 2018. In 2016, Shashe had a net income of \$64,000 from one 30ha contract for sugar beans seeds. This led to requests from other communities to be included in the programme. It also created considerable interest in extending and replicating the approach elsewhere, which led to the development of two large, wide-ranging and complementary projects: CROPS (CReate OPportunities for a Sustainable agriculture and livestock development to enhance the resilience of Beitbridge and Mwenezi


communities) and PROGRESS (Programme for Growth and Resilience).

CROPS (2017–19) is implemented by Cesvi, Terre des Hommes Italia and other partners, and funded by the Italian Agency for Development and Cooperation. Like the initiative in Shashe, it is a community, private and public sector partnership. Its objective is to strengthen community resilience and adaptive capacity to climate shocks, leading to improved and more sustainable living conditions for 14,000 people in Beitbridge and Mwenezi districts. It focuses on rehabilitating and improving 12 irrigation schemes and providing technical and marketing support to farmers to increase production of higher-value crops. Other activities include the introduction of micro-finance schemes, support to improve livestock management, drought and food security monitoring systems, technical training for communities and extension services.

PROGRESS (2017–20) is implemented by a consortium led by the IRC and including Cesvi; it is funded by the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund Programme (ZRBF).¹⁰ PROGRESS takes a similar approach to CROPS, but within a more

¹⁰ ZRBF is supported by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR), the EU, the Embassy of Sweden, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and DFID.

Figure 3 Cesvi resilience-building intervention areas in Zimbabwe



Source: Cesvi 2018

explicit resilience framing. It seeks to enhance the absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities of 20,000 households in Beitbridge and Nyanga districts. It will increase household income by diversifying and strengthening livelihood opportunities, introducing mechanisation, improving and expanding nine irrigation systems, strengthening disaster risk management, linking farmers to markets and financial institutions, and drawing on indigenous knowledge for resilience-building.

3.3 Beneficiaries, equity and inclusion

The Shashe initiative provides access to irrigation for about 200 farmers and their families (1,300 men, women and children). Most small-scale farmers are women (men emigrate to South Africa in search of work). Indirectly, the whole Maramani community (about 4,000 people) should benefit through the generation of economic activities in the area. Beneficiaries provide labour for the initial field works and oversee the operation and maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. The scheme is expected to provide work

opportunities for other labourers at busy times of year.

The scheme is based on common property management and tenure arrangements, with ownership in the hands of the community through a community trust: this is the outcome of the community's long-standing wish for an institution to control and manage its own finances, as well as to protect the scheme from powerful outsiders. The alternative – forming a cooperative – was rejected as being too vulnerable to the influence of government bureaucrats.

The project also revived the largely defunct Irrigation Management Committee (IMC). Beneficiaries were involved in the rehabilitation of the scheme, and participated in dialogue and negotiations with the private sector. The IMC is the managing body of the community trust and is responsible for the routine administration of the scheme. IMC delegates were involved in the project from an early stage, including the initial baseline survey. The IMC is an elected community body, with five men and four women on the committee. It holds regular public meetings. The long-term goal is that it should manage all project infrastructure, and the project has delivered training in basic

management skills to ensure this. The project also helped establish links between the IMC and official local government organisations.

3.4 Actors and stakeholders – partnerships

Developing resilience partnerships is often complex and time-consuming, especially under difficult operating conditions. Cesvi approached the Shashe project as an adaptive process promoting partnerships between the community and other local and external actors. Cesvi's good reputation from its presence in Zimbabwe since 1998, working in emergency and post-emergency relief, management of natural resources and food security, as well as its knowledge of relevant technical and political aspects, was a significant enabling factor. The project also benefited greatly from strong support from the local authorities, based on Cesvi's long-established presence and contacts, and previous partnerships with the local Rural District Council and officials.

The project was based on the creation of a PPCP with public and private sector partners, including the IMC, the Rural District Council, SeedCo, a local private sector citrus grower (Nottingham Estate) and the Beitbridge Juicing Company (now part of Schweppes), which was already producing juice for sale nationally and for export. The private sector actors guaranteed markets for the produce through their commercial links with national and regional agri-businesses, and provided technical support for irrigation rehabilitation works, demonstration plots and tree planting, and ongoing care.

Cesvi played a key convening role, holding extensive preliminary meetings with stakeholders to investigate possible partnership models and supporting the discussions that led to formal agreements. Although it has been a long and difficult process involving extensive discussions with private sector actors, the resulting PPCP and the strong relationships built between private sector growers, juicing factory representatives, the Rural District Council, the Maramani community and Cesvi are strong indicators of future sustainability.

The risks involved in such an innovative collaboration were mitigated by working with local partner organisations with sound, well-established

relationships with key participants. This provided access to skills, experience and networks, and made a crucial contribution to the project's impact. The project addressed potential barriers to effective collaboration, such as lack of political support and distrust between different stakeholders and between beneficiaries and agribusiness firms, by holding consultative meetings with stakeholders, lobbying and involving relevant authorities and community leaders, organising regular meetings between different beneficiaries and hiring a consultant to support negotiations.

While synergies between the Shashe initiative and the other programme components could have been stronger, each of the four components benefited greatly from existing relationships with other organisations. Working with local NGOs with long-term vision and ambition meant that partner organisations had a strong interest in developing synergies with other initiatives. This has been a success factor for the project as, without such networks, it is unlikely that it would have been able to achieve as much as it did.

3.5 Enabling environment and barriers

There were major changes in Zimbabwe during the project period, including worsening macroeconomic conditions and declining capacity in state institutions. These changes limited rural livelihood opportunities and increased pressure on ecosystems. The deterioration of irrigation systems and lack of financial and technical support to vulnerable farming communities were consequences of this. However, these restrictive circumstances may also have opened up space to engage with private sector actors.

The EU's decision to give five-year support to the Shashe project was key to enabling the work to evolve and adapt, and to building effective and strategic partnerships. Five years is arguably the minimum required for setting up innovative agricultural production systems and wildlife conservation projects. Partners also sought to extend their associations with other donors by using the EU funds as leverage to facilitate changes or expand programme components (for example, through support from the FAO for

a demonstration plot in the inception phase). Even so, in 2012–13 Cesvi had to plug funding gaps using additional resources from WFP (for land preparation), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (for improving sanitation in the irrigation scheme) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (for the installation of the third irrigation pivot).

Cesvi's capacity, and that of partner organisations, was occasionally limited by staff turnover and shortages. Cesvi staff

changes during the lifetime of the project were a source of frustration to local partners. In addition, key EU personnel who formulated and supported the development of the programme left soon after it began. Over time, progressive implementation of stricter operational procedures led to improved project management, but also put additional strain on local partner organisations. Friction between partners could have been reduced or avoided through improved transparency of management systems and increased training and management support to the implementing partner NGOs.

4 Conclusions and recommendations

The goal of resilience-building is transformation. Transformation has been described as ‘an approach to holistically and fundamentally build, reshape and enhance people’s capacity to adapt to, anticipate and absorb shocks and stresses’ (Bahadur et al., 2015: 12). It is a deliberate, strategic process, usually involving innovation, empowerment and fundamental changes to the ways in which people’s capacity to adapt to, anticipate and absorb shocks can be built, reshaped and enhanced (Bahadur et al., 2015). Cesvi’s programmes discussed in this report are clearly contributing to transformation. Vulnerable and marginalised people are gaining new knowledge and skills, increasing their income and securing greater control over resources and decision-making. Projects are delivering innovative solutions, creating new institutional alliances and delivering long-term and potentially sustainable gains at scale, despite working in challenging operational contexts characterised by environmental, socio-economic and institutional fragility.

4.1 Resilience pathways and outcomes

Cesvi’s projects embraced an adaptive management approach, allowing for incremental innovation, experimentation and experiential learning and decision-making. Both projects focused on building the capacities of local communities to manage sustainable market-based strategies through integrated resilience programming involving the construction and rehabilitation of key physical infrastructure and the support of various livelihood activities. In both cases, consortium and project partners had to be willing to amend plans and

targets to meet changing circumstances and make ambitious goals more attainable.

In Somalia, the BRCiS consortium evolved from a humanitarian-first approach into a carefully designed graduation model for community resilience. Over time, its components were combined with the provision of assistance services for value chain development and various training activities aimed at building the planning and disaster management capacities of community committees, as well as fostering individual technical and business skills. In Zimbabwe, the Shashe initiative shifted from a traditional agriculture intervention to a system based on new technologies, partnerships and market links. It started by focusing on establishing an irrigation scheme and providing technical support, while the institutional and partnership elements became more significant over time, along with increasing efforts to develop the necessary skills and competencies.

Under the BRCiS Consortium, Cesvi defined resilience through a humanitarian lens by balancing the need to provide humanitarian assistance to address specific stresses with the goal of building community capacity to recover from shocks. In contrast to traditional humanitarian programming, which generally responds to the needs created by a single violent shock, such an approach provided layers of interventions across humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development assistance aimed at building longer-term community resilience to complex risks. This approach is in line with the literature, which recognises that resilience programming can help in bridging the gap between relief and development and allow for a holistic systems approach to understanding shocks (Béné et al., 2012). A similar approach could be followed in Cesvi’s future efforts.

4.2 Beneficiaries, equity and inclusion

Cesvi's projects achieved effective levels of inclusion, employing participatory tools that ensured that all relevant stakeholders were consulted, and building local ownership and accountability. Under BRCiS, men and women took part in single-sex Focus Group Discussions to identify priorities collectively, while community feedback mechanisms promoted accountability. Under the Shashe initiative, men and women elected to the IMC were involved in operating and managing the scheme and participating in negotiations with the private sector, while community ownership was reinforced with the establishment of a community trust to control the scheme's finances and protect it from exploitation.

In all its participatory mechanisms, Cesvi commits to reserve a quota of at least 30% for women. Considering that the female share of labour in farm activities across sub-Saharan Africa is on average 40% (World Bank, 2018), future programming might need to step up ambitions in this area, aim at being more inclusive and put effort into tailoring activities according to the needs of different categories of individuals, supported by careful background analysis.

4.3 Actors and stakeholders – partnerships

Cesvi approached its resilience-building projects as processes, promoting partnerships and links between the community and other local public and private actors, as well as between different communities. Cesvi's long experience in the two countries, together with the good reputation it has developed through its work, were significant enabling factors in establishing successful partnerships. In Somalia, Cesvi worked across scales and funding modalities (humanitarian and development). BRCiS improved links between targeted communities and other stakeholders in the wider ecosystem, as well as analysing and supporting rural–urban links, for

instance through value chain approaches that connected peri-urban and urban areas. It also improved its programming by ensuring that the skills within the partnership were shared as needed among its members through various and continuous coordination mechanisms. Along the same lines, in Zimbabwe Cesvi led the establishment of a strong public–private partnership, building on existing synergies between private sector growers and processors, community representatives and local authorities. It also achieved sustained progress by organising regular meetings between beneficiaries, holding consultations with stakeholders and providing support during negotiations.

4.4 Enabling environment and barriers

Dependence on external funding, and donor conditions, can help or hinder a project, depending on the outlook and rules of the donors concerned. Resilience-building projects need time to mature and a degree of donor flexibility to allow for experimentation and adaptation. In both Somalia and Zimbabwe, progress was made possible by long-term grants (four to six years) that facilitated strategic planning as well as adaptive management, giving the projects time and flexibility to implement activities, develop partnerships and deliver results.

In Somalia, a commitment to learn from experience and improve by embracing a systems approach to programming was attractive to international donors, allowing activities to continue and enabling innovation. Thanks to a number of additional grants, the BRCiS Consortium managed to achieve results despite operational challenges, including security and access and weather-related crises (drought and floods). Similarly, in Zimbabwe, in the face of worsening macro-economic conditions and diminishing state capacity, the Shashe initiative attained demonstrable achievements, which encouraged funding from international donors and allowed the work to expand and develop further through new projects.

4.5 Final recommendations for programming and policy

The Somalia and Zimbabwe programmes have shown that promoting strong partnerships and links between communities, public authorities, international donors and the private sector are key to effective and sustainable community resilience-building. Recommendations for action are needed for many actors, including the international community, national governments and civil society (including international NGOs):

Resilience-building and livelihood approaches in fragile and volatile environments need adaptive management and flexible programming. International donors and policy frameworks should acknowledge that experimental learning and a readiness to pilot new ideas and learn from failure can be key success factors, but this takes time. International donors should work together, overcoming institutional barriers and programming standards and practice, to increase technical and financial support to countries most vulnerable to disaster risks and impacts of climate change, including through mechanisms such as the Global Preparedness Partnership. Sustainable and predictable funding should be allocated to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in fragile contexts, with different and adaptable approaches, in order to contribute to building resilience and enhancing livelihoods (OCHA, 2017).

Interventions enhancing community resilience should be tailored to the specific characteristics of the local context. Interventions aiming to move from a short-term humanitarian perspective to a longer-term development one should invest in background analysis to understand how local resources (socio-economic, institutional and environmental) define local vulnerabilities, but also how they can be key to building resilience strategies. Donors, INGOs, CSOs and local communities should identify a consensus and establish a joint vision on what resilience policy and programming should entail in a given context. For instance, the 2013 Global Hunger Index called for the silos between the relief and development areas to be broken down, and for new collaborations to focus on tracking people's vulnerabilities and related resilience-building activities.

Programmes with a focus on diversifying livelihoods strategies should consider migration and urbanisation as possible adaptive strategies. They should also take into account that, in situations of protracted conflict and extreme climate events, smallholder farmers often transition from rural agriculture-based livelihoods to informal urban ones, or household members migrate in search of better-quality livelihoods. Migration should be integrated into disaster risk reduction strategies targeting both host communities and the displaced, through rural employment opportunities, providing rights to access land to displaced people and preventing conflicts related to access to food and natural resources. For example, in Somalia the BRCiS programme included activities to prepare youth to migrate through skills training and reception packages for new migrants, and IDP interventions focused on capacity-building to help them reintegrate in their local economies. It is crucial also to consider the development potential of migration: in the Shashe area in Zimbabwe, household economies were supported by remittances from men who had migrated to find work in South Africa. Reducing the cost of remittances, reintegration support and financial inclusion should all be endorsed.

Targeting marginalised groups such as women and IDPs is crucial to reducing vulnerability and building resilience. 'Leave no one behind' is a central principle to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which commits countries to consider any of the SDGs not met unless they have been met for everyone. This means prioritising actions to support the poorest and most marginalised, ending extreme poverty in all its forms and reducing inequalities between individuals and groups. This requires specific efforts to ensure that people at risk of being left behind are included from the start, and closing gaps in living standards (Stuart and Samman, 2017). Resilience programming and policy-making should embrace this principle explicitly and incorporate it into new funding instruments (e.g. the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) within the EU's Multi-Financial Framework 2021–27).

Successful programming should actively promote accountability and ownership, and systematically ensure that all relevant stakeholders are consulted where possible. This might entail including the perspectives of local stakeholders in monitoring, evaluation and learning processes by using participatory tools that engage, not only target communities, but also the local authorities and national governments. This also requires designing appropriate accountability mechanisms and being ready to adapt them to the needs of different stakeholders to build trust, support local governance and foster adaptive management.

Adopting a governance-oriented approach that focuses on building and strengthening relationships between a broad range of local public and private actors at different levels (households, communities, systems) is essential to achieving goals in fragile settings. Cesvi's approach to resilience-building as a process, involving the promotion of partnerships between INGOs, communities and companies, should be sustained in the field. At EU level, monitoring the implementation of the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) is key to guaranteeing that economic development is achieved along with improved inclusiveness and resilience.¹¹

Recognising the need to support a long-term vision and a 'durable solutions' approach for the reintegration of displaced people and the sustainable management of an enabling environment is fundamental to fostering resilience. Achieving a longer-term approach entails promoting the development of integrated and harmonised policies and strategies for recovery, resilience and disaster risk management

by supporting flexible and adaptive strategies to address national and local development priorities that are climate-smart, environmentally friendly and gender-sensitive, and address the drivers of displacement. Initiatives such as the Drought Impact Needs Assessment (DINA) and the Resilience and Recovery Framework (RRF) in Somalia are key steps in creating effective enabling environments.

International donors and policy frameworks should promote dynamic and multidimensional approaches to resilience. Building resilience to multiple and interrelated risks requires multifaceted solutions integrating humanitarian assistance and development, covering different sectors with interventions that are both nutrition-sensitive and climate-smart at global, regional, national and local levels.

Scale up investment and improve innovative methodological approaches. New technologies and innovation can potentially help developing countries to tackle a wide range of health, social and economic issues. Multi-stakeholder collaborations (public, private and community) can deliver resilience at scale, especially where it is possible to combine research, innovation and adaptive management of land and resources. In fragile contexts, embracing a mix of innovative technologies is often an opportunity to shift from subsistence agriculture to a community-based commercial enterprise. As indicated in SDG2, international donors and local governments should 'increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services [and] technology development' to build the resilience of agriculture-based livelihoods.

11 The EFSD aims to mobilise EU grants to catalyse investment from public and private sources to tackle the root causes of migration in Africa and the European neighbourhood. It is one of the three pillars of the EU External Investment Plan (EIP).

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